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ABSTRACT
Redefining the Self in postmodern cyberspace
by
Roy Joseph
Dr. Richard Jensen, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Speech Communication
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Cyberspace is a metaphor for an alternative reality situated in the linear, physical
world but yet capable of transcending it. The otherness of cyberspace manifests itself
through virtual transient worlds, reconstituting the stable human subject in a radically
interactive electronic medium. The study identifies three simple stages to demonstrate how
cyberspace accomplishes the dispersion of the human subject: i) role-playing which occurs
in interactive games such as Multi-User Simulated Environments; ii) the deconstruction of
the boundaries between the autonomous author and the reader in hypenextual platforms and
iii) the deconstruction of the boundaries between the virtual and the real in Virtual Reality
machines. By seeking anchoring not merely in the bourgeois reality of linear time and
linear space but also in virtual worlds, the dispersed human subject is creatively enriched
and is momentarily free to redefine oneself in unimaginable ways that poets and visionaries
could only dream about.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
After three thousand years of explosion, by means of fragmentary and
mechanical technologies, the Western World is imploding. During the
mechanical ages we had extended our bodies in space. Today, after more than a
century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system
itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is
concerned. Rapidly, we approach the final phase of the extensions of man • the
technological simulation of consciousness, when the creative process of
loiowing will be collectively and corporately extended to the whole of human
society, much as we have already extended our senses and our nerves by the
various media. Marshall McLuhan in Understanding Media: The Extensions o f
Man.
McLuhan’s “global village" finds its closest ally in cyberspace. The neologism
“cyberspace” that was first coined by William Gibson in his science-fiction novel The
Neuromancer (1984) envisioned the creation of a new social space that will transcend
the limitations of time and space, and virtually facilitate an immense traffic of
information, through the mind-boggling array of computer networks. Gibson (1984)
defines cyberspace a “consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of
legitimate operators” in the “nonspace of the mind” amid “clusters and constellations of
data” (p. 51). The new space or reality, as Benedikt (1991) construes it, is “a globally
networked, computer-sustained, computer-accessed and computer-generated,
multidimensional, artificial, or virtual reality” to “which every computer is a window,
seen or heard objects are neither physical nor necessarily representations of physical
objects” of the physical, natural but that of virtual worlds. Within a decade of Gibson's
work, there is an incredible spawning of various globally linked networks such as the
World Wide Web. The networks, unconstrained by geographical boundaries constitute
I
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an infinity of virtual organisms, replicating polymorphously and invading the immaterial
space of virtual worlds that has no beginning nor end. If the Foucault Pendulum points
to the fact that the earth rotates upon some axis, the virtual worlds of cyberspace on the
other hand do not possess any central axis to organize its structure. The virtual worlds
of cyberspace creates a decentered cyberculture or cybercultures that is better described
by biological imagery and characterized by uncontrollable dissemination:
Biological imagery is often more appropriate .... to describe the way
cyberculture changes. In terms of the way the whole system is propagating and
evolving, think of cyberspace as a social petri dish, the Net as the agar medium,
and virtual communities, in all their diversity, as the colonies of microorganisms
that grow in petri dishes. Each of the small colonies of microorganisms - the
communities on the Net - is a social experiment that nobody planned but that is
happening nevertheless (Rheingold, 1993, p. 6).
Although cyberspace is comparable to a nuclear chain reaction or uncontrollable
biological reproduction, it grows out of socio-cultural environments that wedded
computers with telecommunications technology for the sake of trafficking in commerce,
information, entertainment and just about every other facet of human interaction. This
study tentatively defines cyberspace as a virtual space of virtual worlds and virtual
organisms that constitutes a floating reality or realities emanating from a ‘real-world’
setting, but yet seeking anchorage in intangible, ethereal realms of the imaginary worlds
that demands what Sterling (1992) considers as a “new set of metaphors, a new set of
rules and behaviors” (p. 236).
Cyberspace is Deconstruction: Purpose and Justification
Do human innovations bring about social change or even redefine one’s
perceptions of the self? The character of the archdeacon in Victor Hugo’s l b s
Hunchback of Notre-Dame responds in the affirmative:
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Omitting the detailing of a thousand proofs, and thousand objections to what has
been said, we may sum the matter up as follows: That architecture, up to the
fifteenth century, was the chief register of humanity; that during this interval, no
thought of any complexity appeared in the world that was not built as every
religious commandment has its apparent monument; that human nature, in short,
had not thought of importance that it did not write in stone.... In the fifteenth
century, everything underwent a change. Humanity discovered a means of
perpetuating thought more lasting and durable than architecture, and even
simpler and easier.... To the stone letters of Orpheus are to succeed
Gutenberg’s letters of lead.
The book will destroy the church. (1937, p. 112).
Although Gutenberg’s invention actually played a substantial role in the spread of
Christianity through mass production of translated copies of the Bible, it also subverted
the ecclesiastical authority of the established church at that time. Using the
Gutenbergian analogy, this study poses the question if a radically, interactive medium of
computer-generated realities, popularly now referred to as cyberspace, will redefine
reality or even one’s fundamental perception of the self.
On one hand, the evolution of simulated computer-generated realities reinforce
the progress myth of human mastery, on the other hand the altemateness of these
realities tend to undermine the linear reality of the present by presenting the simulation as
an alternative architecture of its own in competition with the real. As Rifkin (1987)
points out:
The age of progress is about to give way to the age of simulation. The new
simulated vision of the future incorporates the Promethean appetites of the
former age while rejecting the restraints that have shackled it to the historical
consciousness... the future is no longer viewed as something that unfolds in
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strict linear fashion along a historical plane. Rather, it is something that is
continually being reprogrammmed to suit the transitory needs of each emergent
reality .... The new future image conceives of reality as a vast reservoir of
information to be fashioned into simulated experiences (pp. 171-172).
What effects do these above-mentioned simulations generated by computers through
Multi-User Simulated Environments, Virtual Reality machines etc. have on the secure
human subject projected by the grand projects of the Enlightenment and Modemity. The
study hypothesizes that cyberspace deconstructs the notion of the secure, stable subject
in the realm of human-machine interaction.
Bearing this in mind, the explicit purpose of this study is two-fold i.e. a)
demonstrate rhetorically how cyberspace deconstructs the Enlightenment human subject
and disperses the human subject amid the traces of fleeting electronic images and b)
postulate alternative rhetorical strategies such as ‘alternative rhetor’ (ch. 3), ‘media
aesthetics’ (ch. 4) in place of conventional rhetorical concepts such as autonomous
author and so forth. As an important note, it must be mentioned that this study is not
about deconstructing cyberspace or even an empirical analysis about cyberspace, but
about how cyberspace deconstructs the rationalistic, unified subject that has hitherto
given rise to oppressive top-down dualisms such as the producer/ consumer, the author/
reader, reality/ imagination, logic/ emotion, man/ woman, scientific logic/ narrative or
aesthetic logic etc. For lack of time and space, this study will limit itself to the joyful
exploration of a cyber aesthetics. Cyber-aesthetics, here, is a positive euphemism that
indicates a childlike joy in affirming the beauty of liberation springing forth from the
free-play o f the signifier i.e. the Self into a plethora of virtual selves.
How does cyberspace deconstruct the serious, unified subject? The study
identifies three simple stages to demonstrate how cyberspace accomplishes the
dispersion of the human subject: i) role-playing which occurs in interactive games such
as Multi-User Simulated Environments ~ in this case, the Star Trek MUSE - that
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enhances a postmodern subjectivity; ii) the deconstruction of the boundaries between the
autonomous author and the reader in the medium of hypertexts that are platforms for
interactive non-sequendal writing —by analyzing Moulthrop’s hypenextual fiction
Victory Garden and iii) the deconstruction of the boundaries between the virtual body
and the real body through the immersion experience in Virtual Reality machines.
The significance of the study comes from exploring how the altemateness of an
alternative world viz. cyberspace, makes one raise important questions about one’s self
in human-machine interactions. By seeking anchoring not merely in the bourgeois
reality of linear time and linear space but also in virtual worlds, the dispersed human
subject is creatively enriched and is momentarily free to redefine himself or herself in
unimaginable ways that poets and visionaries could only dream about. This study is
important to rhetoricians in crafting new theoretical reconsiderations that invites
rhetoricians not to be merely content with interpreting the existing reality, but in
exploring new ones without shying away in fear or embarrassment. In passing, it might
be worthwhile to mention that this study presumably falls under the category of
rhetorical criticism or the literary realm of rhetoric since it heavily relies on concepts and
a discursive style of argumentation employed by literary theorists and philosophers of
language as vehicles to negotiate alternative rhetorical strategies.
The Internet and postmodern!ty
Philosophers, such as Descartes, in their quest to understand the external
universe valorized a system of absolute truth which supposedly existed a priori to
language and culture. The Cartesian ideal demanded a meek “intellectual submission to
reality as an external, inflexible given” (Middleton, 1995, p. 41). Descartes’
epistemological confidence in an external, objective reality that was rational and absolute
served as a touchstone for modemity. In fact. Western philosophy from Plato,
Newtonian classical physics and the Enlightenment tradition are characterized by the
belief in an objective reality and certitude in an absolute system of knowledge.
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Postmodemity, on the other hand, is a revolt against the Cartesian ideal of modemity
(Rorty, 1991). While modemity displayed austerity and neo-classical seriousness,
postmodemity prided itself in parody and the camivalesque virtues of relativism and
free-play.
Ironically, although the internet that spurs the information age is a product of
logical, rational and scientific operations it displays anarchist, postmodem tendencies
with regard to the dissemination of information (Smart, 1992). First, the intemet yields
itself to deconstructive praxes on several grounds. Second, the language of the intemet
is chiefly in hypenextual or hypermedia form. Hypertexts pertain to a form of "non
sequential writing” that "branches and allows choices to the reader, best read at an
interactive screen” (Nelson, 1981, pp. 1-2). Thus, the user is able to reconfigure the
information in a variety of ways through electronic links that have multiple paths. The
decentered, postmodern view of textualiiy finds itself rejuvenated in the discourse of
computer hypenextuality. To explicate the link between deconstmctive textuality and
hypenextuality, Barthes’ (1974) observations are helpful:
the networks are many and interact, without any one of them being able to
surpass the rest; this text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds; it
has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to it by several entrances, none
of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one; the codes it
mobilizes extend as far as the eye can reach, they are indeterminable .... the
systems of meaning can take over this absolutely plural text, but the number is
never closed, based as it is on the infinity of language (pp. 5-6 & pp. 11-12).
The deconstructive critical act that revels in creating and recreating an infinite number of
significations occludes the possibility of a single authoritative truth emanating from a
text. Barthes’ postulations on textuality holds true for hypertextuality which also offers
endless ways of manipulating and reconfiguring information present on the screen
through the presence of electronic links with multiple paths.
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Third, the Cartesian human subject is displaced and destabilized in the realm of
electronically mediated communication since the "self’ is transmuted into an abstraction
of electronic traces and pixels on the screen; so much so that the user can assume
multiple identities or recreate herself or himself in diffuse ways through email,
conversation via chat rooms and computer conferencing. Poster (1990) argues that the
new wave of communication technologies vis-à-vis computer-mediated communication
reconstitutes the human subject as follows: "1) they introduce new possibilities for
playing with identities; 2) they degender communications by removing gender cues; 3)
they destabilize existing hierarchies in relationships and rehierarchize communications
according to criteria that were previously irrelevant; and above all 4) disperse the human
subject, dislocating it temporally and spatially” (p. 116). Computer-Mediated
Communication (CMC) also appears to disperse the human subject in a suffusion of
infinite contexts since there are practically no limits in navigating through the endless
maze of information that the intemet affords.
Review of Literature
The literature reviewed in this section either demonstrates the postmodem nexus
with cyberculture or reveals the extent to which computer-mediated rhetoric through the
intemet renders obsolete what were previously conceived as insurmountable boundaries
viz. linear time and linear space. Lyotard (1984) speaks of the simultaneous co
existence and correlation between the post-industrial age (the computer age) and
postmodern culture. The two not merely overlap but are said to have reinforced each
other since the simplest or most complex form of computer programming is derived
from linguistic principles. And, by the same token, postmodern culture is fostered by
language games encapsulated in narrative form that parodies objective knowledge and
absolute Truth. Poster (1989) throws more light on Lyotard’s formulation, in stating
that the information revolution "concerns language and can only be investigated by
means of linguistically based concepts” (p. 26). Poster (1989) speaks of two major
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g
trends dominant in the Twentieth Century. The first pertains to the proliferation of many
theories of language (from Saussure, Chomsky, Austin, etc.) that helped evolve a
systematic analysis of linguistic phenomenon, unlike traditional linguistics that focused
on semantics and the evolution of language. The second regards the emergence of new
technologies -- telegraph, telephone, radio, television, computer and communications
satellite - which revolutionized the time-space dimensions of communication and the
relationships between the sender and the receiver. Poster (1989) suggests that these
historical changes in the field of communication required a greater emphasis on linguistic
phenomena, so much so that poststructuralist tools of analysis are handy. Poster’s
(1995) observations on the coterminous relationship between and new communication
technologies are pertinent within the framework of this study. Advocating
poststructuralism as a radical critique of culture. Poster (1995) adds that a
poststructuralist approach to communication theory “challenges and reinforces systems
of domination that are emerging in a postmodern culture” (p. 57).
Poster (1990) also relates the newer forms of computing to the poststructuralist
notion of the decentering of the self. Similar echoes are found in Jameson’s (1991)
postulation that the emergence of a “postmodern hyperspace” coincides with a “great
global multinational and decentered communicational network in which we find
ourselves caught as individual subjects” (p. 44). Jameson (1991) suggests that
contemporary art forms such as painting, photography, architecture, film, video and
literature and communication media create a postmodern hyperspace which is a
disjointed and incoherent social space in which the individual becomes disoriented and
loses his or her sense of physical placement in relation to the environment around them.
This latest mutation in space - postmodem hyperspace - has finally succeeded in
transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to
organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its
position in a mappable external world.... This alarming disjunction point
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between the body and its built environment.... can itself stand as the symbol
and analogue of that even sharper dilemma which is the incapacity of our minds,
at least at present, to map the great global multinational and decentered
communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual
subjects (Jameson, 1991, p. 44).
The disjunction between the body or the self in its relationship with its environment is
said to occur in cyberspace since the self is transported into postmodern hyperspace and
recreated in a diffuse, intangible manner that “distance .... is abolished in the new space
of postmodernism.... to the point that our postmodern bodies are bereft of spatial
coordinates and practically (let alone theoretically) incapable of distantiation” (Jameson,
pp. 48-49). Cyberspace opens up a new gamut of communication practices that
deconstructs the boundaries between the virtual and the real. The opportunity to
navigate the globe without actually traveling reconceptualizes the linear conceptions of
time and space. Cyberspace or Jameson’s “postmodern hyperspace” creates an
alternative physical world of its own in which disembodied physical selves float freely
in virtual time, conversing with each other. Heim (1993) suggests that in this avantgarde realm, “minds are connected to minds, existing in perfect concord without the
limitations or necessities of the physical body” (p. 34). Dery (1994) further articulates
this concept of disembodiment as a new form of empowerment that transcends the
limitations of embodiment that were usually manifest in sexual, ethnic and national
barriers: “The upside of incorporeal interaction: a technologically enabled, postmulticultural vision of identity disengaged from gender, ethnicity, and other problematic
constructions. On line users can float free of biological and socio-cultural
determinants...” (pp. 2-3).
Nunes (1995) considers the intemet as an instrument that provides a
“metaphorical topography” that affords a simulacrum or “simulation of a vast,
undiscovered country in which only our imagination limits our abilities” (p. 317). In
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other words, the intemet “does more than network tlie globe,” creating a metaphorical
world in which there are “promises of new. possible worlds” eventually rendering
problematic the “concept of the ‘world’ becomes ....” (Nunes, p. 314). Nunes (1995)
defines the internet “as a kind of cybernetic terrain .... to undermine the symbolic
distance between the metaphoric and the real” (p. 314). In contrast to elaborate physical
structures like bridges and roads that occupy real space, the intemet in its real and
material presence consists of a matrix of computer machines that network through
telephone lines. While “real" geographical travel consists in moving from one place to
another, the intemet has “geographical figurations of host ‘sites’ and user addresses”
that create a “virtual terrain for the user in which travel amounts to a tracing of
connections from site to site” (Nunes, 1995, p. 317). Cyberspace as a metaphor seems
to have the potential to present the intemet as a quasi-globe having its own virtual
territory. The intemet as a tool provides a “metaphorical topography” that presents the
“simulation of a vast, undiscovered country in which only our imagination limits our
abilities” (Nunes, p. 317). In such a vast realm of limitlessness, the notion of distance
disappears; while presence becomes a “state of simultaneity and transparency” (p. 317).
In simpler worlds, it means that the symbolic distance between the metaphoric
and the real diminishes because surfing in cyberspace can bring about a facade or
simulacrum of something real to confuse it with the real. A commonplace occurrence
such as dating that takes place between two real individuals in real time has a lively
surrogate in cyberspace. Poster suggests that the deconstruction of boundaries between
the “virtual” and the “real” in cyberspace has far-reaching economic and political
implications as well (1995). The intemet has the potential to undermine “in some ways
... the territoriality of the nation state” since messages in cyberspace cannot be
“delimited in Newtonian space” (Poster, 1995, p. 28). Poster cites the Teale-Homolka
trial of early 1994, a case of “multiple murders involving sexual assault and mutilation,”
in which the Canadian govemment was unable to bring about an “information blackout”
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because of Usenet postings from the United States that were made available in Canada.
Cyberspace can thus, potentially defy the “character of power of modem governments”
especially when communicative acts that “are defined by one state as illegal” can be
bypassed because of the decentralized nature and structure of the intemet (Poster, 1995,
pp. 28-29).
The intemet facilitates an unwieldy transmission and dissemination of
information that conventional theories of communication are not adequate in addressing
it. The postmodem credo of anti-authoritarianism can be traced in the discourse of
cyberculture where “property rights are put in doubt when information is set free of its
material integument to move and to multiply in cyberspace with few constraints”
(Poster, 1995, p. 29). The uncontrollable process of reproduction and dissemination of
information has raised other concerns such as intellectual property rights so that
companies would still retain monopoly over their product. As Poster puts it: “The
problem of capitalism is how to contain the word and the image, to bind them to proper
names and logos when they flit about at the speed of light and procreate with indecent
rapidity .... at any decentered location” (1995, p. 29).
Poster (1995) goes on to imply that the issue of free expression is inevitable in
the realm of cyberspace. Since cyberculture presents avenues for pluralism through the
existence of polyphonic narratives that are decentered and thus not, subservient to any
monopolistic ideology. Postmodernism, as a conglomeration of radical critiques
professes to exist for the same reason. Just as post-structuralism problematizes the
concept of authorship, cyberculture problematizes the concept of ownership since
cyberspace is owned by everybody and nobody at the same time, postmodern theorists
see in it a clear pattern of perpetual decentering in which multiple voices marinate,
embracing a world without a foundationalist, extra-textual referent to dictate its path
(Poster, 1995).
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Slouka (1995) elucidates that as the cyberspace keeps evolving, the distinctions
or boundaries between technology and physiology would become increasingly blurred.
Human minds will be divorced from their bodies in such a way that seemingly "our
minds grafted onto computers" are capable of realizing for us “the contents of our
imagination (or allowing us to experience one another’s imagination) meeting one
another in electronically generated spaces ..." (pp. 19-20). In this futuristic period, the
boundaries between self and other, male and female, man and machine and even life and
death are bound to become obsolete. While acknowledging that some of these claims are
ludicrous, Slouka however, affirms the radical difference technology can bring about at
the accelerated pace in which it seems to be progressing. In the present, it is possible to
routinely interact with individuals, however, in the not-too-distant future it will be
possible to touch them. Slouka suggests that “feedback technology would provide the
illusion of touch directly to one’s (sic) nervous system” (1995, p. 19). Physical space
could potentially become optional in cyberspace, once computer technologies duplicate
sensory experiences and bombard the mind in a seemingly vertiginous battle between the
simulacrum and the “real.”
Baudrillard (1983) suggests that human existence revolves around “digitality”
and spoke of the emergence of a simulational culture in which reality, hyperreality and
virtual reality coincided. Dery (1996), on a similar note, speculates on the state of
cyberculture at the end of the century and observed that technology seems to be in an
irreversible process. Cyberculture, in particular, brings about the “ephemeralization of
labor and the evanescence of the commodity” which in tum is “paralleled by the
disembodiment o f the human” (p. 6). The overwhelming sense of a parallel reality
fostered by the machine competes with the material reality of the user and eventually
manages to alter perceptions of everyday existence in terms of impact. Dery (1996) also
suggests that cyberculture is fast “approaching escape velocity in the philosophical as
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well as the technological sense” because it “resounds with transcendentalist fantasies of
breaking free from limits of any sort, metaphysical as well as physical” (p. 8).
Rheingold ( 1993) addresses the issues of “boundaries” in cyberspace, stating
that in the new public sphere, people will no longer be judged by their bodies (color,
sex, age, disability) and in a similar vein, addresses the flip side of this freedom
asserting that the “authenticity of human relationships is always in question in
cyberspace” (p. 147). Benedikt (1991) envisages cyberspace as a “territory swarming
with data and lies, with mind stuff and memories of nature, with a million of voices and
two million eyes ... billowing, glittering, coursing ... a city ... recognizable and
unrecognizable at once” (p. 2). The idea of data, as opposed, to physical presence
distinguishes cyberspace from physical space. Yet, Benedikt (1991) conveys the sense
that the boundaries between “material" and “immaterial” presence becomes
deconstructed, when “disembodied” beings float freely in cyberspace, unfettered by the
constraints of their physiology.
Haraway (1991) sees cyberculture as an opportunity to challenge the hierarchical
dualisms of Enlightenment metaphysics so that technology can transgress the boundaries
between the natural and the artificial, the organic and the inorganic and promote an
overall invalidation of all philosophical hierarchies. Haraway contends that a
postmodern deconstruction of the dichotomies is revivified in the discourse of
cyberculture since the science and technology of the intemet breaches the dualisms of
Western thought. Taking sides with the poststructuralists who debunk the binary
classifications of Western philosophy viz. body/soul, other/self, matter/spirit,
emotional/logical, natural/artificial and so forth, Haraway (1991) suggests that
cyberculture transgresses these boundaries between the natural and the artificial, because
virtual space or cyberspace can create an assortment of non-linear “worlds” in the which
the Cartesian human subject defined as the “self’ finds itself deconstructed and
dispersed in multiple ways. Intermingling a Freudian approach that dismantles the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

notion of the unified “s e lf (by introducing the notion of the Unconscious that subverts
the “conscious” self) and a Derridean deconstructive approach, Haraway (1991)
celebrates the death of the Cartesian subject in cyberspace.
Bolter (1991) and Landow (1997) see in hypertexts an interface between
computer media and contemporary critical theory such as poststructuralism. Landow
(1997) specifically demonstrates how the discourse of hypertexts with its links, nodes,
networks, webs and paths are prefigured in the writings of Barthes and Foucault who
conceived a text in terms of networks and links. Landow (1992) cites Foucault who
remarked that the “frontiers of a book are never clear-cut” because “it is caught up in a
system of references to other books, other sentences; it is a node within a network....”
to demonstrate the inextricable link between a postmodern textuality and hypertextuality.
Hypertext that constitutes the language of cyberspace is composed of electronic links
that facilitates non-sequential movement from one verbal passage to another, and can be
further enhanced by hypermedia that would include visuals, animation, sound and other
forms of data (Landow, 1992). Landow (1992) sees a striking parallel between lexia (
a poststructuralist term for layers of texts within a text, that makes a text deconstructible)
and the electronic links that comprise hypertexts in which the reader can create texts in
“non-linear, or, more properly, as multilinear or multisequential” manners that renders
problematic the notion of an original text or even authorship per se.
The eclipse of authorship coincides with the gradual demise of traditional print
culture. For example, Marshall McLuhan (1962) employed the expression
“Gutenberg’s Galaxy” to signify the beginning of the end of the dominance of print
culture so much so that he ends his book (entitled Gutenberg’s Galaxy) with the
epilogue entitled “Galaxy Reconfigured” (p. 265). The linear dimensionality of print
culture that characterizes Gutenberg’s Galaxy had given rise to the valorization of
concepts such as authorship, the constructions of the self and producer/consumer
dichotomies. Ong (1982) suggests that the cultural definitions of the self in Western
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culture, to a great extent, has been influenced by print. Various innovations in the
history of print has accordingly modulated the constructions of the self. Bolter (1996)
documents that the “invention of the stream-driven press and the serialized novel” gave
rise to “new constructions of self’ (p. I l l ). The advent of print is said to have been
instrumental in the creation of “the two most influential versions of the self’ - the
Cartesian ego and the Kantian subject (Bolter, p. 111). The proponents of print culture
popularized the notions of “the autonomy of the individual” and also “a radical
separation between subject and object” to the extent that both the “visual and sensual
aspects of human nature were subordinated to the faculty of reason” (p. I l l ). In brief,
print is said to have overemphasized the uniqueness of authorship which was not really
significant or was almost absent in the premodem era of orality. Further, words are
said to have subordinated images and “abstraction was privileged at the expense of the
senses and sensory information” (Bolter, p. 111).
However, it must be noted that even before the popularization of the personal
computer and the internet, philosophers and postmodern theorists began attacking the
constructions of the “enlightened, autonomous Cartesian ego” that were disseminated
through the medium of print (Bolter, p. 111). The autonomous Cartesian ego usually
represented itself in the form of the author whose ubiquitous presence loomed over the
pages of the text, persuading the reader to submit herself or himself to the super-ego of
the author. The only way, to postmodernists, to challenge this hierarchy was to debunk
the concept of “authorship.” Barthes (1968), one of the leading poststructuralists,
boldly declared that the “birth of the reader is at the expense of the death of the author”
(p. 142). The demise of the author is posited as a necessary precondition not only to
deconstruct the modernist subject, but also to liberate the reader from the constraints of a
linear tradition.
The postmodern angst over the representation and glorification of the Cartesian
ego in print culture gives way to celebration with the rise of the new electronic or
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computer writing technology known as hypertext which destabilizes and disrupts the
linear text of the printed word (Lanham, 1993). Hypertext is a form of programming
that involves a range of devices that includes computer animation, video, audio voice
over, diagrams, the possibility of making connections from one written piece to another
in a non-linear fashion. The simultaneous assortment of all these elements is difficult in
traditional print which makes hypertextual writing fragment and decenter the emplotment
of the narrative. Significant differences in the form leads to subsequent differences in
the content of the experience. For instance, the reader in the print tradition is active
only insofar as interpretation is concermed, but passive with respect to authoring. The
reader in the hypertextual platform is active with respect to interpretation and authoring
since s/he can play in the collaborative authoring role as well by making physical
additions and supplements as well. However, as exceptions it must be remembered
there are some works such as Julio Cortagon’s Hopscotch that employs multiple
narrative links within the print tradition.
Hypertext or multimedia, by its essence, fragments the traditional conceptions of
beginning, middle and end because the user can use her or his imagination in
deciphering the writing the way s/he chooses to do so. As a result, each user or reader
could reconstruct the information in multiple ways that the notion of linear writing is
easily deconstructible. The three dimensional nature of hypertext, as Lanham (1993)
puts it, is “fuguelike” involving a lot of “subtexts... that disempower, unpack, the force
of the linear, printed” word (p. 21 ). Since the reader or the user is able to create as
many permutations and combinations as s/he possibly can, the notion of the original
form as produced by the author becomes problematized, significantly inverting the
hierarchy between the author and the reader. The reader can become the author in her
or his own right by reconfiguring the information and experiencing what Barthes (1977)
affirmed as “pleasure of the text.” The “pleasure of the text” or “jouissance,” as Barthes
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explains, attributes an erotic dimension to reading so that the reader assumes the attitude
of a playful lover instead of a faithful partner and prefers liberty over fidelity.
Once the reader is unfettered by the chains of referentiality and linearity of the
word, s/he is free to make up her or his version of the text. Hypertext writing similarly
affords the same possibilities that poststructuralists talk about since its medium is
polyvocal (many voiced) and exploits the referential ambiguity of the ‘sign.’ In other
words, what the sign alludes to becomes unclear once the point of referentiality is
obfuscated (Bolter, 1991). Bolter (1996) sees hypertexts as the “writing technology that
best realizes the strategies of poststructuralist theory” (p. 112). Hypertextual writing
predominates the discourse of the internet since the information encoded in websites is
hypertextual. The hypertextual nature of websites, as seen in new media technologies
leads postmodern scholars such as Landow (1992) to see a convergence between
contemporary critical theory and new media technologies since the two embrace
decentered communication practices.
Method
Poststructuralist analyses essentially revolve around deconstructive critical
strategies. Deconstruction, can be summarized as a “profound critique of logocentric
texts” and the humanistic “subject’s relation to them” by subverting or challenging
authoritative meanings in turn for a more pluralistic free-play of meanings (Poster,
1990, p. 104). A brief explanation of “deconstruction” is in order to demonstrate its
usefulness as a theoretical rationale for this study. The term “deconstruction” which is
the brain-child of French philosopher Jacques Derrida, etymologically has its roots in
Martin Hiedegger’s concept of destruknon —which means “destruction” or more
specifically, the destruction of Ontology which is a branch of metaphysics that studies
the nature of being (Lehman, 1991, p. 23).
“Deconstruction” has an elusive definition. Most of its proponents refuse to
define deconstruction as a theory or a philosophy. Although the term conjures up
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images of “destruction” and “construction” which were combined into a neologism
“deconstruction,” Derrida resolutely refuses to accord it any proper definition. Derrida
suggests that “all sentences of the type ‘deconstruction is X ’ .... a priori misses the
point (cited in Lehman, 1991, p. 23). If this be the case, what is deconstruction then?
It is precisely this refusal to defy categorization that lends it so much of novelty though it
is already well-entrenched within the academia. Lehman (1991) looks at deconstruction
as a form of blending together of “elements of linguistics, literary criticism and
philosophy” into a sometimes arcane “method of analysis that can be used within diverse
disciplines” having as a stated goal the dissolving of boundaries and borders (p. 24).
Although Lehman’s (1991) definition has a pejorative connotation, the view that
deconstruction dissolves borders and boundaries is extremely useful in the light of
studying cyberspace because it deconstructs hitherto rigid boundaries of time and space.
However, for the purpose of this study, deconstruction will be defined as a
system of thought or critical strategies that challenges the Western philosophical tradition
and especially the absolute claims of truth put forward by modernity. Derrida
expounded on the need to depan from the logocentric (“Reason”) tradition of modernity
and the binary system of western metaphysics. Binaries which are polarities or
opposites have been used as tools to legitimate the ideological superiority of one system
of thought over the other. Johnson (1981) summarizes Derrida’s deconstructive critique
as follows:
Western thought, says Derrida, has always been structured in terms of
dichotomies or polarities: good vs. evil, being vs. nothingness, presence vs.
absence, truth vs. error, identity vs. difference, mind vs. matter, man vs.
woman, soul vs. body, life vs. death, nature vs. culture, speech vs. writing
.... the two terms are not simply opposed in their meanings, but are arranged in
a hierarchical order which gives the first term priority.... (p. viii).
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Derrida contends that the first term is usually privileged over the second and thus
creates hierarchies. Instead Derrida prefers to erase the boundaries between the two and
invalidate the ability of one system to oppress the other. Derrida and the other
postmodernists demonstrate that one’s constructions of knowledge are always situated
within language which means that there are no prelinguisdc truths such as those
projected by modernity. Miller, one of the leading postmodernists in the literary
academia declares that “language is not an instrument or tool in man’s hands, a
submissive means of thinking. Language rather thinks man and his world” (cited in
Middleton, p. 51). Gergen (1991) corroborates Derrida’s critique of logocentric
presupposition that language is a product of the autonomous human subject as follows:
Language is a system unto itself. Words derive their capacity to create a seeming
world of essences from the properties of the system. This system of language
preexists the individual; it is “always there,” available for social usage. Thus
anything said about the world or the self should, in principle, be placed in
quotations (p. 107).
In other words, the modernist view that the autonomous self exists outside the realm of
language and culture and can thus pontificate metaphysical truths is debunked by the
view that the thinking subject is always situated within the confines of language. Thus
all transcendental or metaphysical claims are put within quotation marks, meaning that
they are culturally constructed and have no ahistorical truth value. Further, language by
virtue of its unstable structure is subjected to a “freeplay of difference” (Derrida, 1978).
This freeplay signifies the slipperiness and multiplicity of meanings involved with
language in which the relationship between the signifier and the signified is not merely
arbitrary; but also that the signifier has an infinite number of signifieds marked by
dispersals and absence.
What is relevant here, is not so much the theories of poststructiualism or
deconstruction per se, but its rhetorical application in cyberspace. Cyberspace presents
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itself as a self-contained system in which nothing extraneous (besides the technological
tools) can curtail its discourse. Similarly, poststructuralism works against any single
ideology by affirming that language (which inscribes reality) is in turn marked by
dispersal, absence, multiplicity of meanings or even no meanings. In other words,
“there is nothing outside the text” (Derrida, 1981, p. xiv). Extrapolating this dictum into
cyberspace, the virtual space facilitated by computer networks is self-contained and not
unlike language is autotelic or self-generating, being all-encompassing and highly
pluralistic. While poststructuralism revolves around “decentering,” cyberspace is
fostered by a decentralized, interactive communication network. Cyberspace constitutes
the new medium in which traditional boundaries from the space-time continuum are
continually becoming obsolete and deconstructed. These new technologies brings about
a deconstructive shift in perception which is reinforced by Stenger’s (1993) observation
that in cyberspace:
Perception would change, and with it, the sense of reality, of time, of life and
death. We would .... ‘enter the world of Fluids,’ it would be ‘over with the
solid, over with the continuous and with the calm,’ some dance quality would
invade everything, and Cartesian philosophers would go through a trance,
floating on history like chops on gravy (p. 50).
The method for this study chiefly consists in demonstrating how cyberspace in
itself, deconstructs the Enlightenment subject and opens up the free-play of the signifier
‘self into an endless series of virtual selves and thus create new rhetorical strategies that
address the process of dispersion. Cyberspace as a signifier for limitless virtual worlds
is shown to deconstruct the humanistic subject through three stages: a) Multi-User
Simulated Environments that are interactive role-playing games in which the ability for
players to assume various personae under conditions of anonymity that facilitates a
blurring of boundaries between the simulacrum and the real in an ostensible manner, b)
hypertexts that are radically, interactive electronic texts that allows non-sequential
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writing and an authoring experience for the reader thus erasing the distinction between
the Enlightenment construction of the autonomous author and the reader and c) the
immersion experience in virtual reality machines that allow the users to experience
virtual worlds thus deconsmicting the boundaries between the virtual selves and the real
self as the human-machine interaction consummates in rendering the difference almost
indistinguishable.
Chapter 2 will employ Beaubien’s (1996) essay “Playing at Community: MultiUser Dungeons and Social Interaction in Cyberspace” in which the author outlines a
couple of principles viz. a) “open-ended role-playing” allows a “great breadth of
possible roles and functions” and b) “the fundamental reality” in which players react is
“altered” to demonstrate how MUSEs, with specific reference to Star Trek’s TOS
TrekMuse carry on the postmodern charade of multiple identities and vigorous roleplaying to the fine point of momentarily altering one’s perception of the self.
Chapter 3 will employ Landow s Hypertext 2.0 (1997) which speaks of the
convergence of two apparently unconnected and unrelated areas, namely,
poststructuralist criticism that is primarily a sophisticated version or extension of
textuality and hypertexts that are computer programmed languages used in the intemet
and other computer generated media. Landow’s formulation that the lexias of
poststructuralism and the electronic links of hypertextuality are similar in its function of
deconstructing the binary classification of the author versus the reader since the reader or
the user can create multiple subtexts in a variety of ways that problematizes the notion of
the original text, as intended by the author. The convergence between critical theory and
new media technologies, as argued in Landow’s Hvpertexts will be used as the guiding
principle to demonstrate in chapter 3 how hypertexts erase the hierarchy between the
Enlightenment concept of the autonomous author and the reader and thus facilitate the
inception of a more emancipatory rhetoric, christened as the interactive rhetor. Chapter
3 dicsusses Moulthrop’s hypertextual fiction Victory Garden to demonstrate how
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hypertexts facilitate readers to take part in the authoring process by exploring their own
narrative structures.
Chapter 4 will employ Baudrillard’s (19941 Simulacra and Simulation which
speaks of the simulacrum as a referent unto itself, as a principle to show that the
simulacrum of virtual reality experiences blurs the Enlightenment Self and the linear
reality of the real world. Virtual reality by deconstmting the subject opens up the field
of play again by invoking new rhetorical strategies such as virtual ontotheology and
media aesthetics which will be explicated in chapter 4. Chapter 5 will summarize the
findings of this study and also discuss the implications of this research, in terms of the
direction in which communication research on new media technologies may take.
Last but not the least, it must be acknowledged that the virtual exploration of the
otherness and altemateness of cyberspace is impossible without social and material
conditions that give rise to it. It must also be acknowledged that this study was based
on an inside/outside dichotomy i.e. the study concerned itself chiefly with the conditions
of human-machine interactions inside cyberspace as opposed to the outside that refers to
the external world without which even pure fantasies are impossible.
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CHAPTER 2
POSTMODERN POETICS AND THE REDEFINITION OF THE SELF IN
CYBERCULTURE: TALL TALES OR TRUE LIES?
The mythical Icarus in a premeditated moment of hubris attempted to fly with
wings of wax into the skies, aspiring towards a state of boundless freedom denied to
mortals by the ethereal pantheon. His liftoff that led to a tragic death reverberates as a
reminder of the metaphorical retribution that awaits the foolhardy who wishfully place
their grandiose faith in the ephemeralness of human accomplishment. Cyberculture,
however, brazenly disregards the portents and jeremiads of the avenging Graeco-Roman
mythical gods and goddesses and breeds utopian fantasies to the chagrin of both the
luddite and the social realist. Its enthusiasts have attributed soteriological (a theological
term pertaining to salvation) significance to the astounding technological feats that
surround the creation of the intemet and the accelerated pace of computer technologies.
The physicist Frank J. Tipler in his quasi-theological work The Physics of Immortalitv:
Modem Cosmology. God and the Resurrection of the Dead suggests that an
“omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent God .... will one day in the far future resurrect
every single one of us to live forever in an abode which is in all essentials the JudeoChristian heaven” (1994, p. 1). Interestingly, the “God” that Tipler postulates is an
Omega point (a term borrowed from the French theologian Tielhard de Chardin)
denoting an entity of infinite density and temperature towards which the universe will
regressively collapse in a reverse Big Bang called the Big Crunch. Tipler suggests that
the energy emanating from this implosion can be used to “drive a cosmic computer
simulator with infinite processing power - enough, certainly to bring back to (virtual)
life every creature that ever lived” (Dery, 1996, p. 9).
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In effect, futurists, science-fiction writers, millenia]ists. computer hackers and a
medley of other groups share an undeniable fascination with the untapped power of
computing; a curious interest that includes bizarre techno-eschatological visions of
humanity evolving into a posthuman phase when computer robotics is wedded to
physiology to give birth to a posthuman cyborg and also Enlightenment visions of
humans reaching the summit of technological mastery. Hollywood’s The Terminator
and Star Trek’s androids are only a few examples of pop culture’s enchantment with
futuristic entities that are products of human-machine interactions. Artificial Intelligence
theorist Hans Moravec predicts that human societies are about to enter a “postbiological”
universe in which robotic creatures can “mature into entities as complex as ourselves’’
(Dery, p. 8). Mathematician and science-fiction author Vemon Vinge goes further to
state that the cybernetic evolution will give birth to a “greater than human intelligence’’
robotic creature than can independently think and eventually assume control of its own
destiny. Many other theorists have echoed similar sentiments about cyberculture helping
humans transcend the constraints imposed by physiology.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the Enlightenment notion of the
unified self is challenged via: a) cyberpunk and cyborg that are useful explanatory
constructs to describe the diffusion of boundaries in human-machine interactions, b)
MUSE (Multi-User Simulated Environments) that enhance role-playing and anonymity
and c) the ability to recreate oneself through various personas.
Cyberpunk, Cyborgs and Morticians of the Absolute.
“Cyberpunk” started out originally as the title of Katie Hafner and John
Markoff’s (1991) book that referred to a subculture of computer users who were chiefly
outlaws or hackers, who could break into computer security systems, data banks, and
involve themselves in illegal activités in cyberspace. However, the term was gradually
stripped of its derogatory connotations as it soon began to subsume a growing literary
genre and an avant-garde cultural reality. The ideology of cyberpunk fiction and theory
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centers around blurring or deconstructing the boundaries between humans and
machines. Sterling (1992) suggests that cyberpunk perspectives constitute “braincomputer interfaces, artificial intelligence, neurochemistry -- techniques radically
redefining the nature of humanity, the nature of self’ (p. 196). Barnes (1996) adds that
visions of cyberpunk “encompasses the idea of body invasion - implanted circuitry,
cosmetic surgery, prosthetic limbs, and genetic alteration” not very unlike Gibson’s
“mental visions” of “biological alterations” occurring in cyberspace (p. 196).
Haraway ( 1991) speaks of more radical ways of fragmenting the Cartesian
subject by endorsing the conception of “cyborg” that subverts the epistemological
foundations on which the human subject is defined. The cyborg as a “cybernetic
organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a
creature of fiction” (Haraway, 1991, p. 149) is a new type of human persona on
cyberspace that replaces the personality by “pure information whose configurations
‘signify’ disembodied human sensoria, personality constructs, and artificial
intelligences” (Tomas, 1991, p. 35). The cyborg represents the culmination of the
symbiosis between human and machine interaction and challenges the notion of human
uniqueness that have been deeply embedded in the cultural consciousness of human
beings. Cyborgs present an opportunity to challenge the hierarchical dualisms of
Enlightenment metaphysics; so that technology can transgress the boundaries between
natural and artificial, the organic and the inorganic and promote an overall invalidation of
all philosophical hierarchies (Haraway, 1991, p. 152).
Cyberpunk and cyborgs constitute an altemative vision in the tradition of
Nietzche, Hiedegger and Derrida that eclipses the Cartesian philosophy of cogito ergo
sum (I think, therefore I am). Descartes in his magnum opus Meditations apotheosized
the unfragmented cognitive self as the exclusive way of knowing:
I know plainly that I can achieve an easier and more evident perception of my
own mind than of anything else.... I will converse with myself and scrutinize
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myself more deeply; and in this way 1 will attempt to achieve, little by little, a
more intimate knowledge of myself (Descartes, 1986, pp. 22-24).
Descartes' inclination for the transcendental first-person “I” - in the tradition of the
ancient Greeks -

only reflects his unswerving faith in Ontology. Philosophers who

lived in the shadows of the ancient Greeks, delighted in the notion of logos that
represented the fountain-head of language, thought, reason, and truth. The logos
constituted the grounds on which epistemology and ontology were constmcted; around
which most of Western philosophical thought revolved. Plato, in particular, basked in
the thauma (wonder or magic) of the logos that marked the disclosure of Truth in all its
facets. Hiedegger, on the contrary, suggested that “at the heart of truth lies a wonder, a
sacred mystery, which .... asks us to encounter again, repeatedly, the uncovering of
things into their hiddenness, all gathered into language, as truth” (Ross, 1997, p. 3).
Hiedegger carried the torch from Nietzche and embraced the latter's predilection for the
Dionysian over the Apollonian underscoring a preference for the frenzied, orgiastic
nature of art and literature over a structured and ordered vision of the world. Since art
possesses the peculiar trait to represent (mimesis) or re-present (anti-mimesis) the “real,”
thus blurring the synthetic boundaries between reality and imagination, Hiedegger
(1994) declared that “Truth, in its nature, is un-truth” (p. 54).
Hiedegger’s notion of “Dasein” presents another challenge to the Cartesian
unified self. The “Dasein” that alludes to “Being in the world” also encompasses a
contrasting conception of “Being with the world.” The notion of “Being in the world”
denotes the “I am” or discrete first-person “I” or the possessive pronoun “myself.” On
the contrary, “being with the world” entails a cognizance of “an extended self’ or “theyself ’ that goes beyond the implications of a temporal being who is merely concerned
with herself or himself. The juxtaposition of the above-mentioned counteracting
propositions within the “Dasein” or the “Self’ simultaneously problematizes and
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debunks one of the grand metanarratives of the Enlightenment that upholds the centrality
of the monolithic Self.
In Hiedeggerian parlance, the juxtaposition of the human persona with the digital
persona in the World Wide Web carries with it the potential to redefine one’s perception
of the Self. Although the conception of cyborg remains fictional, postmodern scholars
and cyberenthusiasts endorse its implications in challenging some of the reifications of
modernity that placed an overemphasis on the human ego. Baudrillard (1983), for
instance, applauded the automation of the robot in glowing terms because it represented
“ a perfect double for man, right up to the suppleness of his movements, the function of
his organs and intelligence” (p. 93). Barnes (1996) suggests that the mechanical robot
can not only double for the human body, but eventually replace it. In the same way,
human presence could be substituted by a cyborg personality. In brief, the project of
postmodemity would be to replace the tyranny of modernity (which glorified the human
subject and elevated one particular version of Reason over the others) so that the “Self’
gives way to multiple selves in creating a non-hegemonic cyberculture.
Multi-User Simulated Environments.
The identity of a culture is derived by a conjunction of various determinants,
namely its history, time-span and space. The interaction of spatio-temporal dimensions
with culture-specific variables distinguishes one culture from the others at a
macrocosmic level, and one individual from another at a microcosmic level. One such
space that dominated the discursive practices of Western “work-oriented cultures” is
Euclidean space that became a master space since communication is governed by its
“space of measure and transport,” “linked homogeneity,” and “congruent identity”
(Serres, 1983, pp. 44-52). However, as opposed to the homologous nature of the
Euclidean model. Serres (1983) argues that an individual is a product of the
“intersection” of manifold social spaces and cannot therefore conceivably exist in a
unified and homogeneous social space. Serres (1983) espouses the presence of multiple
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spaces and predicates that though the body “works in Euclidean space,” it sees in
“projective space,” “touches, caresses, and feels in a topological space,” “suffers in
another,” “hears and communicates in a third; and so forth, as far as one wishes to go”
(p. 44). The presence of multifarious spaces and times through which the individual
communicates or negotiates his or her identity problematizes the conception of a unified
self.
Multi-User Simulated Environments (MUSE) present a postmodern panorama of
decentered, destabilized entities that marinate in a world without a secure foundation,
where role-playing and schizophrenic subjectivity eclipse the idea of the autonomous,
undivided Self. Lyotard (1991) argued in The Postmodern Condition that meaning is
created socially only through participating in language games in which the rules
constituting a game must be “agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual
cancellation” (p. 61). Beaubien (1996) applies Lyotard’s arguments concerning
language games to MUSEs. Lyotard (1991) states that the goal of society should be to
create a communication system characterized by perfect information and complete
freedom. Beaubien (1996) suggests that Lyotard’s dreams are realized by advanced
computer programming as displayed in MUSEs. MUSEs, as Beaubien (1996) defines it
are “computer-based, role-playing games that create social environments in cyberspace”
(p. 180). They constitute a “multi-user space, by which through programming players
create and constantly redefine the fundamental reality in which they interact” (p. 180).
Multi-User Simulated Environments are interactive adventure games that have
much in common with hypertextual fiction. However, the users or writers who are
involved in the work can engage in a form of creative dialogue creating their own stories
by assuming and recreating different personas. Beaubien (1996) identifies three
characteristics that distinguishes MUSEs as a new form of social interaction; “a) the
game involves multiple players who interact directly, b) role playing promotes firee and
creative expression and c) MUSEs are computer-mediated, which creates a dynamic.
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responsive and immersive space to play” (p. 181). The difference, however, between
MUSEs and other forms of interaction is that while most games that involve multiple
players such as basketball and others confine the players to certain specific functions,
MUSEs on the other hand, allow “open-ended role playing calls for a great breadth of
possible roles and functions” (Beaubien, p. 181). The ability to assume multiple
personas permits anonymity and also creates potential for those players who
communicate with their real personas as opposed to those who frivolously assume
different roles. For example, Rheingold (1993) tells the story of a MUSE user (a
heterosexual male) who proposed marriage to a fellow player named Sue, only to find
out later on that Sue was actually a married man named Steve. As Rheingold describes
it: “the opportunity for deception .... is designed into the medium. Cyberspace
explorers ignore that fact at their peril” (p. 166).
Nonetheless, the texts of MUSEs are reminiscent of the decentered texts of
poststructuralist thought where both the author and the reader are subjected to the
ubiquitous power of language. In this case, the ubiquitous power of new
communications technology manifest in cyberspace can change peoples’ perceptions of
themselves. As Randall Wesler predicts:
Cyberspace .... will change what humans perceive themselves to be, at a very
fundamental and personal level.... There is no need to move about in a
physical body like the one you possess in physical reality. You may feel more
comfortable, at first, with a body like your “own” but as you conduct more of
your life and affairs in cyberspace your conditioned notion of a unique and
immutable body will give way to a far more liberated notion of the “body” as
something quite disposable and, generally limited .... The ability to radically and
compellingly change one’s body-image is bound to have a deep psychological
effect, calling into question what you consider yourself to be (cited in
Rheingold, p. 191).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

These changes that are possible through MUSEs in virtual reality, as Bolter states, can
bring about “the dissipation” of the “Cartesian e g o .... as completely as any postmodern
theorist could wish” (1996, p. 117). Since virtual reality denies any monolithic
constructions of the self as a linguistic entity and also destabilizes the autonomous ego
of the human subject (in the Enlightenment) into a multiplicity of selves so that the
difference between the real and the virtual are problematized (Bolter, 1996).
http://tos-www.tos.net: Welcome to Star Trek’s TOS TrekMuse
TOS TrekMuse is a role-playing game based on the original Star Trek Television
series. MUSEs seem to fulfill Taylor and Saarinen’s (1993) contention that new media
technologies create a simulacrum that displaces or challenges the real:
The point is not simply that truth and reality have been absorbed by illusion
and appearance. Something far more subtle and unsettling is taking place.
Somewhere Nietzche suggests that when reality is effaced, appearances
disappear as well. What emerges in the wake of the death of oppositions like
truthrillusion and reality/appearance is something that neither truth nor illusion,
reality nor appearance, something other. The other is yet unnamed (p. 15).
TOS TrekMuse in particular allows players to assume various roles either as part
of the Federation, the Klingon Empire, the Tholian Hegemony or the Romulan Empire.
Instead of being an active interpreter of the text as in watching a movie or a television
show, the player can assume the role of an active creator. He or she could commandeer
the Starship Enterprise, navigate the spaceship to explore strange and new worlds,
encounter other-planetary creatures belonging to either the past or the future, take part in
diplomatic missions or wage wars. Although the players are required to acquaint
themselves with the cultural mores of each Empire, they have the freedom to choose a
character from any of the four major Empires stated above and create their own character
sketch with respect to each act or scene of the play that they are involved in. In effect.
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the players create their own dialogue, character sketches, plots and subplots, pathos,
deus ex machinas and so forth.
The rhetorical act of immersing themselves in role-playing creates a doublepresence viz their identity as players and their identity as personas within the game.
For example, if one were to play Captain Kirk, there is an interplay of multiple realities
as the player fluctuates between the dramatic persona of Captain Kirk from the
television show, the player’s own identity and the new persona of Captain Kirk that the
player creates in the game. The mediation of various strands of reality or realities create
the “illusion of images as reality because we can move and change the images and thus
are deluded into thinking we are effective in the real world” (Phelan, 1996, p. 42). The
blurring of the boundaries between the simulacrum and the real takes place in ingenious
ways. For instance, the player who first uses the NAV PILOT command can
automatically pilot the space ship. The player can enter the Navigation Console of the
Enterprise by typing in NAV CONSOLE and is provided with a list of commands that
assists him or her in inter-galactic travel that transcends the dimensions of “real” time
that he or she is in. The existence of several, seemingly real-life commands enhances
the simulacrum and juxtaposes the real and the virtual in an almost indistinct manner.
An active participation in a MUSE game of this nature, not only requires
following the classical formulation of willingly suspending one’s disbelief, but also a
radical embracal of a new subjectivity to get into the mind and heart of the new persona
that the player has created. MUSEs consummate the postmodern quest for subjectivity,
detemporalization and decontextualizadon in an immanent state of simultaneity that
debunks the diachronic and embraces the synchronic.
The Postmodern Condition
What is postmodernism? Before an explanation is attempted, a critique of
scientific rationality and the Cartesian ideals of modernity is in order to understand the
intellectual forces behind this movement. Modernity apotheosized “Reason” as evident
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from the scientific rationality that pervaded the Enlightenment and excluded the “other/s”
so much so that Derrida (1978) considered its “entire philosophical tradition, in its
meaning and at bottom” to have “common cause with oppression” (p. 91). For
instance, Descartes’ faith in an absolute system of human knowledge caused him to
observe in his famous treatise Discourse on Method that humans, could become “the
masters and possessors of nature” (p. 37). As Olthius (1990) notes, the quest for
totalization and mastery is a recurring motif in the discourse of modernity since “the
unity of truth is purchased only at the cost of violence, by repressing what doesn’t fit
and erasing the memory of those who have questioned it” (p. 351).
Modernity, according to its critics, emphasized the superiority of one worldview
over the other by its emphasis on absolute truth. As Gergen (1991) observes: “when
convinced of the truth or right of a given worldview .... a culture has only two
significant options: totalitarian control of the opposition or annihilation of it” (p. 351).
Hiltier's pogroms in World War 2, the imperialistic mindset of the European
conquerors, male-dominant paradigms and other examples of attempts at mastery
emerge out of totalizing aspirations that “denies all heterogeneous difference or dissolves
it into a homogeneous unity, effectively co-opting, dominating or eliminating that which
is perceived as the other’” (Middleton, 1995, p. 35). Though it may seem unfair to
blame modernity for all the social ills of the world, Lyotard concludes that modernity due it its dogmatism- has given us “as much terror as we can take” (1984, p. 81).
Modernity encompassed a mindset that valorized a particular conception of
reality through scientific knowledge and displayed a tendency towards belief in an
ordered universe and in an over-arching system of thought that universalized timeless
truths that were not contextualized within the framework of language and culture. As a
result, the human subject who was situated within the dominant paradigm of reality
subjugated the other - that included women, aboriginal people and “others” - in his
(notice that it is not her) “imperial ego” and became the “endlessly acquisitive conqueror
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and pioneer” (Lasch, 1984, p. 137). The Cartesian notions of modernity overplayed the
role of the autonomous self through absolute knowledge and scientific know-how that
the “geocentric world of the ancients and medievals” was replaced with “an
anthropocentric world of discover)' and conquest that displaced the plurality of nonWestem cultures with the hegemony of Western colonialism” (Middleton, 1995, p. 48).
To give a specific example of the disillusionment against modernity, one might consider
the case of Columbus’ discovery of America. While many commemorated his discovery
by celebrating the 5(X)th anniversary of his arrival in America; voices of dissent were
also heard that echoed the sentiments of grief over the loss of a pristine, almost mythical
paradise in which a prelapsarian state of innocence capitulated to the belligerent monolith
of modernity (Sale, 1990).
The growing disenchantment with the formerly “unproblematic” view of
Columbus’ discovery marked a cultural shift that signified the end of an epoch. As
philosopher Borgmann puts it: “An epoch approaches its en d .... when its fundamental
conviction begins to weaken and no longer enthusiasm among its advocates” (1992, p.
22). In other words, the loss of faith in modernity marked the advent of postmodemity.
This cultural shift is epitomized by the rapid shift in cultural values that no longer
celebrates the ideological superiority of modernity that excluded or submerged the
discourses of native people and also other counter-cultural views that did not fit into the
lens of a scientificfrationalistic worldview. Eagleton’s (1987, February) remarks:
We are now in the process of wakening from the nightmare of modernity,
with its manipulative reason and fetish of totality, into the laid-back pluralism of
the postmodern, that heterogeneous range of life-styles and language games
which has renounced the nostalgic urge to totalize and legitimate itself (February
20, TLS)
crisply demonstrates the rapid decline of modernity that was giving way to a more
pluralistic ambience that characterizes postmodernism in which disenfranchised groups
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become empowered and expose the assumptions of their dominant precursors by paying
closer attention to language. The process of empowerment, in postmodern parlance, is
possible only through unmasking the ideological undercurrents of the dominant
modernist paradigm, by stripping away its claims of being abstractions of timeless
truths. In other words, all articulations of truth are merely a product of human
discourse. Human discourse, in turn, is a product of language and culture. Since
language and culture are contextually determined, there are no self-evident truths
because there are a multiplicity of contexts that widely differ from each other just the
way the lived experiences of different people cannot be homogenized into a totality.
Thus, instead of perpetuating the metaphysical myths of modernity - that were
concretized into one master metanarrative that supposedly revealed absolute truth and
reality, Foucault (1977) suggests that the pompous illusions of the modernist subject
must be “stripped of its creative role and analyzed as a complex and variable discourse”
(p. 138). Guinness (1994) aptly distinguishes the differences between modernism and
postmodernism as follows;
Where modernism was a manifesto of human self-confidence and selfcongratulation, postmodernism is a confession of modesty, if not despair.
There is no truth; only truths. There is no grand reason: only reasons.
There is no privileged civilization (or culture, belief, norm and style); only a
multiplicity of cultures, beliefs, norms and styles. There is no universal
justice; only interests and the competition of interest groups. There is no
grand narrative of human progress; only countless stories of where people
and their cultures are now. There is no simple reality or any grand
objectivity of universal, detached knowledge; only a ceaseless
representation of everything in terms of everything else (p. 105).
Postmodern parody of metanarratives
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Postmcxiemism abandons metanarratives and gleefully desecrates the edifice of
modernity by parodying such grandiose constructions of reality. Metanarratives which
refer to “generalizing narratives” that claim to provide “universal frameworks for the
discernment of meaning” (McGrath, 1996, p. 186) were rejected as authoritarian and
fascistic. Lyotard (1984) argued that all universal narratives were intrinsically
totalitarian in their outlook and could be potentially capable of “generating mindsets
which were conducive to ‘crimes against humanity’” (cited in McGrath, p. 187).
Similarly, Eagleton (1987) contended that postmodernism “signals the end o f ....
‘metanairadves’ whose secretly terroristic function was to ground and legitimate the
illusion of a ‘universal’ human history” which implies that “Science and philosophy
must jettison their grandiose metaphysical claims and view themselves more modestly as
another set of narratives” (February 20, TLS).
Postmodernism, from this perspective, presents itself as a negative critique of
abstract systems of truth by displaying its suspicions against “grounding or legitimating
stories” such as “the modem myth of autonomous progress” since such stories serve to
be the source for totalitarian control when carried to its logical culmination (Middleton,
1995, p. 70). Lyotard (1984) captured the essence of this suspicion through his wellknow statement: “Simplifying in the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity
towards metanarratives” (p. xxiv). The existence of metanarratives, to the
postmodemists, suggest that anything that does not fit into the framework of these great
stories meant that they were automatically subjected to silence and marginality.
Metanarratives thus fostered a sense of hegemony. For instance, the metanarrative of
science and progress excluded those who did not subscribe to this tradition. The
postmodern rejection of the master metanarratives that hastened the demise of modernity
is well-echoed in the words of Kundera who responds to Descartes’ view of man as
Master and owner of nature: “Having brought off miracles in science and technology,
this ‘master and proprietor’ is suddenly realizing that he owns nothing and is master
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neither of nature (it is vanishing, little by little, from the planet), nor of History (it has
escaped him), nor of himself (he is led by irrational forces of his soul). But if God is
gone and man is no longer the master? The planet is moving through the void without a
master. There it is, the unbearable lightness of being” (1986, p. 41).
This “unbearable lightness of being” that Kundera speaks about is the
postmodernist’s epiphany of liberation in which s/he feels herself/himself free from the
unwholesome yoke of modernity whose metanarrative of mastery was laced with threats
of marginality to those who do not conform. Nonetheless, what makes the absence of
metanarratives “unbearable” is the feeling of the void within. The only way to address
this situation is to pay attention to local narratives or the stories that have been, until
now, unheard. The debunking of the master narrative of modernity is now being
replaced by the voices of marginalized people (women, aboriginal peoples, African
Americans and others) who are revolting against the dominant paradigms of the past that
valorized one system of values over the other.
The postmodern debunking of modernity begins by uncovering the fact that the
reality, which the dominant ideology espouses is socially constructed. Berger and
Luckmann (1967) who first introduced the term social construction of reality; referred to
it in the context of people becoming aware that the reality they perceive to be true is
merely a construction of cultural products and thus has no intrinsic validity.
Postmodemists like Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and others construe the reality of
modernity; not merely as a social construction but also as a construction that has its
roots in violence and mastery. Deirida (1972) considered the realism of the dominant
Westem intellectual tradition as a philosophy that revolved around “metaphysics of
presence.” In other words, metaphysics of presence refers to the mood to consider our
conceptual systems of truth as a given which exists prior to language and thought
Instead postmodemists contend that there are no prelinguistic or precultural realities
which renders suspicious the attempt to construct a rather universal system of truth.
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What the modernists claim to be naturally present (such as universal truths) is now
reckoned to be absent and the given in itself is now considered to be a construction of
human discourse (Middleton, 1995).
The next step, as Hutcheon (1989) describes is to “de-naturalize some of the
dominant features of our way of life; to point out that those entities that we unthinkingly
experience as ‘natural’ (they might even include capitalism, patriarchy, liberal
humanism) are in fact ‘cultural’, made by us not given to us” (p. 2). Once people
dismantle all their reifications (or constructions) and totalizing projects, Derrida (1978)
and the postmodemists usher them into a new world that celebrates a free play of
difference. A good example, in passing, to demonstrate Derrida’s claim, will lie in
comparing and contrasting the differences between classical theater and postmodern art.
While classical theater is marked by austerity and elegance, postmodern art/or culture
“seems more like a carnival with a never-ending array of sideshows” (Gergen, p. 193).
Middleton (1995) provides a rather useful illustration to highlight the differences
between classical art (that has more in common with modernity) and postmodern art/or
culture:
There is no center to this production. Unlike even a three-ring circus, this
carnival offers only the clamor of multifarious sideshow hawkers calling out
for our momentary attention. They do not seek commitment in any ultimate
sense; they only want to entertain and titillate us with the weird and wonderful
world they are peddling....The heavy seriousness of classical theater and the
heavy-handed domination of modernity are replaced by the postmodern carnival
(p. 42).
From the above passage, it can be inferred that the grand circus of modernity
which occupied centerstage for a long period of time gives way to a conglomeration of
smaller side-shows in which every side-show is a break away from the center-stage.
The center-stage, until now, was occupied by the canonical masters who subscribed to
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the dominant paradigms of ‘order’ and ‘mastery.’ With the advent of postmodemity,
the center-stage is dismantled and a series of side-shows take place. That is, the voices
of unheard people which include women, non-White people and an interminable array of
other subjugated groups begin to be heard.
Decentering the Intemet
In 1969 the United States Department of Defense’s Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA) developed a decentralized communication network referred to
as the ARPANet to enhance military communications in the event of a nuclear threat.
Over the next two decades, the scope of the ARPANet diversified to encompass civilian
life as well since universities, commercial industries, govemment agencies and nations
across the globe completed the metamorphosis of the ARPANet into the Intemet which
now became a global network of networks. Users could navigate through labyrinthine
networks and access information by clicking from one “multimedia site to another,
bouncing from digitized video clips to snippets of sounds to screenfuls of texts without
end” (Dery, 1996, p. 6). The intemet soon emerged as the latest global rendez vous for
millions of PC users who had the added advantage of the convergence of various media
technologies such as television, radio, telephones, computers and so forth.
Postmodern society is radically decentered and thoroughly disseminated.
As a result of this dispersion, the machine of socio-cultural reproduction is
no longer controlled by centralized agencies. Center and hierarchy give way
to periphery and horizontality, creating a lateral expanse that extends
endlessly in undefined directions. In the absence of centralized and
hierarchical control, localized interventions in the structures of cultural
reproduction and social reproduction become not only entertainable but
sometimes even entertaining (Taylor & Saarinen, 1993, p. 15).
The uncontrollable process of reproduction and dissemination of information
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can potentially destabilize hierarchies and raise concerns such as intellectual property
rights. Monopolistic capitalism has conceptually operated in an unified space that
valorized and homogenized the distinctions between the producer and the consumer of
information. The intemet, on the contrary, is interactive and decentralized which
increases possibilities for a more egalitarian, transnational, transcultural flow of
information and dialogue. The intemet supersedes the narrow territorial mindsets of
nation-states and globally embraces a multi-directional, polyvocal and polyphonic
character that defies categorization or neat compartmentalization within the confines of
any particular culture. Rheingold (1993) affirms that:
There is no such thing as a single, monolithic online subculture; it’s more like an
ecosystem of subcultures, some frivolous, others serious. The cutting edge of
scientific discourse is migrating to virtual communities, where you can read the
electronic pre-printed reports of molecular biologists and cognitive scientists. At
the same time, activists and educational reformers are using the medium as a
political tool. You can use virtual communities to find a date, sell a lawnmower.
publish a novel, conduct a meeting (pp. 3-4).
Rheingold’s perception of the intemet as a melange or “ecosystem of subcultures” is an
apt characterization of the multitudinous nature of the internet. The diversity of its users
renders the medium pluralistic and decentered, obstructing the dominance of one
subculture over the other. Seemingly, most of the intemet users appear to be either from
the United States or Westem Europe raising concems that the preponderance of Westem
users may usher in a Eurocentric worldview in cyberspace. Yet, the undisputable fact
that a new wave of computer programmers are emerging from other countries outside
Westem Europe and the American continent are only indices that technical know-how is
not confined to the economically affluent nations. The global movement of programmers
across the world, and the growing interface between the East and the West are going to
inextricably intertwine the economies of various nation-states and create an unparalleled
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confluence of software and money. Cross-national interactions in cyberspace, to this
effect, on the one hand can foster a greater unity between people-groups and at the same
time, reinforce specific cultural and idiosyncratic differences or even recreate new ones.
Postmodern culture and cyberculture
Extensions of postmodern culture are evident in the discourse of cyberculture in
a variety of ways. First, cyberculture revels in the absence of metanarratives and
symbolizes a form of “counterculture” which is counter to the hierarchical structure and
absolute order of modernity. Cyberculture is a consortium of a variety of culturally and
socially disparate groups such as New Agegroups, virtual reality pioneers,
psychedelics, hackers, and others who find this new medium conducive to free
expression (Rushkoff, 1994). As Gibson (1984) puts it, cyberculture is an:
accretion of dreams: tattoo parlors, shooting galleries, pinball arcades,
dimly lit stalls stacked with damp-stained years of men’s magazines, chili
joints...sushi bars, purveyors of sexual appliances, pawnbrokers, wonton
counters, love hotels, hot dog stands, tortilla factories, Chinese
greengrocers, liquor stores, herbalists, chiropractors, barbers, bars... (p.
28).
In cyberculture, the master linear narrative of modernity is deconstructed in favor of
a multiplicity of local narratives. There are no absolutes in the internet since there are
infinite possibilities with infinite ways of expressing ideas accompanied by the scope of
the very coexistence of infinite ideas themselves. Second, the very conception of reality
appears to be deconstructed to embrace the postmodern conception of multiple realities.
Gibson’s definition of cyberspace throws light on the postmodern cultural implications
of the internet.
Gibson (1984) first employed this neologism “cyberspace” to depict a futuristic
sci-fi scenario in which individuals could have their nervous systems linked to a global
computer network known as the matrix and simultaneously experience virtual reality in
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the highest sense. Gibson (1991) notes that the word “cyberspace” was coined as an act
of pop poetics to describe contemporary postmodern culture. Drawing his inspiration
from watching kids play video arcade games, Gibson described that these games had the
effect of “a feedback loop with photons coming off the screen into kids’ eyes” with
“neurons moving through their bodies, and electrons moving through the video game”
(cited in McCaffery, 1992, p. 272). ‘These kids clearly believed the video games that
were projected" so much so that Gibson established a correlation between video game
kids and future computer users who seemed to “develop a belief that there’s some kind
of actual space behind the screen, someplace you can’t see but you know is there” (p.
272).
The third postmodern condition evident in cyberculture is the marginality or
absence of the “body” and réévaluation of the “self.” One of the highlights of
cyberculture, as Stone (1991) observes is that these electronic networks are a
“manifestation of a new social space” in which concepts like “distance, inside/outside,
and even the physical body take on new and disturbing meanings” (pp. 83-84).
The rapid advent of new media technologies carried with it revolutionary
changes in communication practices. Due to cyberspace communication, “the
boundaries between the subject, if not the body, and the ‘rest of the world’ are
undergoing a radical reconfiguration, brought about in part through the mediation of
technology” (Stone, 1991, p. 101). Rheingold (1993) corroborates the view that the
current use of computer networks like the internet, will significantly alter our
relationship to physical bodies in the process of communication since people can now
communicate in “virtual” or “electronic” spaces and develop relationships without the
need to interact in a face-to-face situation. Some of these changes in communication
praxis display strong postmodern tendencies in deconstructing the autonomous self of
modernity, and replacing it with many fragmented selves that can assume different
identities. Poster (1990) argues that the “self’ in the new electronic/computer media is
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“decentered, dispersed, and multiplied in continuous instability” (p. 6). In other words,
there are possibilities for playing with identities, removing gender cues, destabilizing
existing hierarchies and dispersing the local subject in space and time (Poster, 1990).
The unified or autonomous self of modernity finds itself deconstructed in
cyberspace since the electronic media fragments self-conceptions such that the “subject
is changed in computer communications, dispersed in a postmodern semantic field of
time-space, inner/outer, mind/matter” (Poster, 1990, p. 115). Gergen (1991) states that
the fragmentation or the “fragmentations of self-conceptions corresponds to a
multiplicity of incoherent and disconnected relationships” (p. 7). He further states that
the possibility of indefinite electronic relationships can invite “us to play such a variety
of roles that the very concept of an “authentic self" with knowable characteristics recedes
from view” (p. 7). The deconstruction of the modernist self into a multiplicity of other
selves not only renders authenticity difficult, but also transforms the self-centered
Cartesian of modernity into a caricature that has been decentered into smaller personas.
Prior to Poster and Gergen, Meyrowitz (1985) echoed similar sentiments that “electronic
media have changed the significance of space, time and the physical barriers as
communication variables” (p. 13). These communication variables have been addressed
at a radically different level by postmodernists such as Haraway, Lyotard, Baudrillard,
Derrida, Poster and others.
Cyberspace radically challenges some of our constructions of self that were
supposed to be inherently rooted in time and space. Poster (1990) summarizes the shift
that cyberspace embodies, that is from the diachronic to the synchronic and from the
linear to the multifaceted in the following manner “We are being changed from
‘arboreal’ beings rooted in time and space, to ‘rhizomic’ nomads who daily wander at
w ill.... across the globe, and even beyond it through communication satellites, without
moving our bodies at all” (p. 15). In other words, what constitutes the “self’ has to be
redefined in cyberspace. The “self’ is reconstituted in different ways in which it
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expresses itself without the limitations of the physical body. The identity of the self is
constructed and reconstructed to the point of becoming fragmented. People could “alter
their gender and/or sexuality on the internet” and consequently “there will be no fixed
self, but multiple selves and identity will be further fragmented with each interaction in
cyberspace” (Lipton, 1996, p. 343). Taylor and Saarinen’s remarks most effectively
summarizes this discussion on the redefinition of the self in cyberspace:
In Cyberspace 1 can change my self as easily as 1 change clothes. Identity
becomes infinitely plastic in a play of images that knows no end. Consistency is
no longer a virtue but becomes a vice; integration is limitation. With everything
always shifting, every one is no one (Shifting Subjects, p. 1).
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CHAPTERS
THE READER AS AUTHOR/THE CONSUMER AS PRODUCER: TOWARDS A
RHETORIC OFHYPERTEXTUALITY
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
the falcon cannot hear the falconer.
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold.
W.B. Yeats’ The Second Coming
The mythical Oedipus after years of abandonment and banishment, unwittingly,
in fulfillment of an oracle killed his father Laius and married his mother Jacosta.
Sophocles' dramatic rendition of the myth attributes the tragic downfall of Oedipus not
just for his incestuous entanglement with his mother but also for his act of defiance
against the gods in supplanting the divinely-ordained king Laius. Oedipus’ ensuing
existential dilemma eloquently foreshadows the pathos of most tragical protagonists
down the ages who cry in unison with Prince Hamlet’s tortured soul: “To be or not to
be, that is the question.” Usurping authority was an ominous sacrilege such that even
innocent subjects who revolted against corrupt monarchs were not spared either from the
agonies of their own embattled consciences or the severity of societal judgment For
better or for worse, the kings and queens enjoyed certain unimpeachable privileges such
as divine rights that legitimated their authority even in the face of tyranny until
democracy of the common rabble eclipsed the monarchy. To extrapolate this analogy
into the realm of rhetoric, one could say that the history of conventional critical, literary
and philosophical inquiry guarantee the author of texts with almost quasi-divine
hermeneutical privileges that demanded the humble submission of the reader to authorial
omnipresence and also the continual attention of the reader to the intentions of the author
through the words of the text.
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The author was ever present in his or her message made translucent through an
apparently porous medium of expression. The essence of the author’s message could be
abstracted from the text, through a process of meticulous reading that paid attention to
rigid context and semantics. The lowly reader, in the absence of face-to-face interaction
with the author, played the long-suffering Penelope waiting for the metonymical author
Odysseus. Not unlike Odysseus’ homecoming, the author would appear and offer a
decisive answer pertaining to the meaning of the text. However, it was not uncommon
that the wait for the absent author bore striking resemblance to Lucky and Pozzo’s
interminable wait for Godot in Beckett’s existentialist classic Waiting for Godot.
Godot’s unending absence rendered him an enigma not merely to the tramps Lucky and
Pozzo but also to the reader. Not infrequently, the process of deciphering authorial
intent has more in common with the metaphorical quest for Godot than Odysseus.
Epitaph for the author
If arriving at the central meaning of the text as the author intended it, is similar to
waiting for Godot - the absence of the author necessitated his or her ejection from the
position of hermeneutical privilege that was hitherto denied to the reader. The New
Critics were among the first to begin avidly writing the epitaph for the author. The
stability of the Word like the hitherto indivisible atom was destabilized by Saussure who
dissected the word in terms of the sign, signifier and the signified. The Structuralists
following Saussure averred that meanings are negotiated only through an interplay of the
sign, the signifier and the signified through an abstract, impersonal system of
underlying linguistic structures and thus rendered the author unessential in the sphere of
rhetorical and literary discourse. The poststructuralists following the Nietzchean “death
of God ”philosophy, not merely pronounced the death of the author but also offered the
authorial persona rites of passage into a state of oblivion where the Orphean lyre would
play a dirge only to the soothe the dead and forgotten.
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The poststructuralist rhetorical strategy of subverting the author opened up the
field of interpretation to the reader in experiencing what Derrida considers the “rupture”
of “a fixed origin” (1978, p. 278). The absence of a “fixed origin” in a text disrupts the
entire history of western metaphysics based on the concept of centered structure or
secured ground: “the history of metaphysics .... could be shown that all names related
to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable
presence -- eidos, arche, telos, energia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject)
aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth” (Derrida, p. 279).
Instead, Derrida advocates that it is “necessary to start thinking that there was no center”
and rejected it because “the center could not be thought in the form of a present-being
.... had no natural site .... was not a fixed locus b u t.... an infinite number of signsubsdtutions” (pp. 279-280). The absence of a center demands a significant
paradigmatic shift in reading. The notion of authorship, absolute truth. Consciousness
and other metaphysical constructions revolve around the conception of transcendental
signifieds such as Being, the progress myth and so forth. In other words, the
decentering of the concept of the centered structure had to occur to preclude the
privileging of one mode of signification over the others. Derrida’s heuristic proposition
“there is nothing outside the text” debunks the notion of origin or the “transcendental
signified” and goes so far as to erase the distinction between the signifier and the
signifier. To do so, Derrida erases the distinction between the denotative and
connotative layers of meaning encrusted within words and suggests that
“everything becomes discourse” in which a free-play of meanings or significations occur
(pp. 278-279). The infinity of significations that occur through the deconstructive
critical act of decentering the text removes the text semantically eons of time away from
what the author originally intended. In effect, the shift from the teleological proposition
of what the author purposed or intended to a more autotelic conception of language and
textuality signifies not merely the displacement of an author-centered hermeneutic, but

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

also the dethronement of metaphysics and validates the demand for new
critical/rhetorical strategies for reading.
Intermezzo; Apologias and disclaimers about deconstruction
Given this background, this chapter seeks to articulate a rhetoric of hypertexts
through three steps a) the ejection of the autonomous author from the seat of
hermeneutical privilege b) the erasure of boundaries between the author and the reader in
the discourse of hypertexts and c) the construction of the conception of the ‘interactive
rhetor’ that provides an alternative to the broadcast model of communication that
privileges the producer above the consumer. Poststructuralist readings of the internet
and the decentered nature of the internet in itself play a significant role in reshaping the
parameters of communication practices given the increasing convergence of various
media in cyberspace. At the same time, it is imperative to craft an eclectic rhetoric
without necessarily capitulating to some of the nihilistic ruminations of
poststructuralism. Without dispensing with the human subject altogether or displaying a
fetish towards a hermetic textuality or even hiding behind the walls of methodological
rigor, the rhetorical critic may glean some of the strengths of poststructuralism as he or
she deems it fiL Not unlike Hermes Trismegistus, the legendary inventor of the magical
seal that kept vessels air-tight, Derrida and many of his followers have divorced
textuality from the lived experiences of readers by elevating textuality to a hermetic space
that is impervious to the joys and pains of human existence. The distinct lifeexperiences of each individual reader will carry-over into reading so much so that a
hermetic approach to textuality is almost ludicrous, though some poststructuralists
would have us believe that deconstruction is a neutral, amoral, ahistorical and apolitical
critical act. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that deconstruction has enhanced
reading by accommodating the free-play of differences in dismantling the hegemony of
one interpretation over the other. Yet, deconstructive strategies themselves can evolve
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into a new form of hegemony or tyranny when poststructuralism is granted undisputed
privilege over other schools of thought.
Writing across the borders
Pablo Picasso’s mediumistic expression “Painting is stronger than me, it makes
me do what it wants” is a powerful solicitation to acknowledge that the medium is more
powerful than the message it tries to convey. Does the genius of the author inspire the
work or does the immaterial presence of the medium author the artist’s work? The
question raised above presupposes that the medium does indeed have a life of its own,
and yet belong to the community at large. The Enlightenment era privileged the author
over the reader, thus divesting the shared power of information that previously belonged
to the community into the hands of the individual author or the publishing house.
Gutenberg’s invention of the printing machine, on one hand, brought with it tremendous
liberatory potential. For instance, the mass production of translated copies of the Bible
in the vernacular helped common people “search the scriptures” (John 5: 39) for
themselves and challenge some of the unchristian practices of the clergy whose
knowledge of Greek and Latin accorded them hermeneutical privilege over the laity.
The emergence of print transformed and challenged the power structure within the
Established church, as droves of devout seekers began experiencing the “royal
priesthood” (1 Peter 2: 9) that was hitherto denied to them, as the veil of separation
instituted by the Church between the clergy and the laity began to unravel. On the other
hand, the print medium institutionalized authorship. As McLuhan describes it:
“Authorship” - - in the sense we know it today, individual intellectual effort
related to the book as an economic commodity —was practically unknown
before the advent of print technology. Medieval scholars were indifferent to the
precise identity of the “books” they studied. In mm, they rarely signed even
what was clearly their own. They were a humble service organization.... The
invention of printing did away with anonymity, fostering ideas of literary fame
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and the habit of considering intellectual effon as private property. The rising
consumer-oriented culture became concerned with labels of authenticity and
protection against theft and piracy. The “idea of copyright” the exclusive right to
reproduce, publish, and sell the matter and form of a literary artistic work —
was bom (1967, pp. 122-123).
One of the fallacies in granting the interlocutory “author” precedence over the
interlocutory “reader,” arises from a blatant disregard of the self-expressive power of the
medium that the author chooses as well as the common body of shared meanings that the
authorial interlocutor shares with his ‘audience.’ To draw an analogy, a painter can
choose strokes and shades from a polychromatic, picturesque landscape composed of
images from his or her mind, the external world, the paintings of his peers or
predecessors or plainly the stream of consciousness dictated by the painting in itself.
Similarly, the author or rhetor can only mediate his or her text through a preexisting
language that presupposes endless intertextuals chains or links to other texts. A
perceptual shift from the author as the hermeneutical epicenter to the medium of
expression and the texts themselves defaces the “pitiless divorce which the literary
institution maintains between the producer of the text and its user, between its owner
and its customer, between its author and its reader” (Barthes, 1974, p. 4).
Barthes (1974) argues that the “goal of literary work is to make the reader no
longer a consumer, but producer of text” (p.4). One of the ways in which to empower
the reader is to prefer the writerly text over the readerly text. The readerly text plunges
the reader into “a kind of idleness” that makes s/he “intransitive” and deprived of “access
to the magic of the signifier, to the pleasure of writing” (p. 4). The writerly text is
“ourselves writing before the infinite play of the world” that appreciates the “plural” or
even the “image o f a triumphant plural, unimpoverished by any constraint of
representation” (Barthes, p. 4). The production of writerly texts are possible only
through the reconfiguration or reconstitution of conventional reading habits that are
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mimeüc, one-dimensional and referential to specific objects of the universe. The
writerly text contests the Platonic view that “an is twice removed from reality,”
considering the medium of art to be the existing reality. The self-referentiality of the
writerly text, to Barthes, is the only way to guarantee plural significations and the freeplay of difference.
Nothing exists outside the text, there is never a whole of the tex t.... the text
must simultaneously be distinguished from its exterior and from its totality. All
of which comes down to saying that for the plural text, there cannot be a
narrative structure, a grammar, or a logic (Barthes, 1974, p. 6).
Barthes’ suggests that writerly texts are “polysemous,” “multivalent” and indeterminate
since the “systems of meaning” that can take over this absolutely plural text can never be
closed since it is based on the infinity of language. The plural or writerly texts are
composed of an infinite universe of signifiers and signifieds where the margins between
the denotative and the connotative recede into the abyss of seeming textual chaos. The
master narrative or central truth of the text is dispersed and infinitely deferred amidst a
labyrinth o f textual traces that the reader who seeks it is left wandering pointlessly
looking for the elusive Minotaur. Unlike Theseus who eventually found and slayed the
Minotaur, the writerly text conceals the Minotaur beyond recognition and defaces it, as
the infinity of significations transforms the hypothetical center into an never-ending
series of traces. The absence of a center creates glorious possibilities for the reader to
rewrite the text in endless ways.
The elimination of direct one-to-one referentiality with the ‘real world’ in the
writerly text due to the fact that the text, in itself, becomes a galaxy of signifiers is an
indication that the poststructuralist rhetoric deems it fit to appropriate the medium as the
message. Even so, within the dominant print tradition, Barthes modestly confesses that
it is rare to find a writerly text:
There may be nothing to say about the writerly texts. First of all, where can we
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find them? Certainly not in reading (or at least, very rarely: by accident,
fleetingly, obliquely in certain limited works): the writerly text is not a thing, we
would have a hard time finding it in a bookstore. Further, its model being a
productive (and no longer a representative one), it demolishes any criticism
which, once produced, would mix with it: to rewrite the writerly text would
consist only in disseminating it, in dispersing it within the field of infinite
difference

The writerly text is the novelistic without the novel, poetry

without the poem, the essay without the dissertation, writing without style,
production without product, structuration without structure ( 1974, pp. 4-5).
Although there have been postmodern novels and works of non-fiction such as
Derrida’s Glas that resemble the writerly text in granting the reader creative freedom
through its presence of multiple narratives, hypertextual writing fulfills deconstructive
strategies of poststructuralist rhetoric in a more meaningful way. For the ’average
reader’ if ever such a hypothetical category exists who is not exposed to deconstructive
criticism reading may not necessarily be as problematic as the poststructuralists predict
it. Reading tends to be a more straightforward activity for the vast majority of readers
who have neither read Derrida and Barthes nor care to understand them. In praxis,
hypertextual writing comes closest if not actually realizes the strategies of
poststructuralist writing without having to deliberately resort to the semantic twistings or
distortions of the cultural context that gives rise to texts.
In fact, Derrida and Barthes encountered and wrestled with a rather severe
contradiction in their own writings. On one hand, their writings were mediated through
print culture which gave birth to the infamous book that constituted a totality; but yet
attempted to transcend the limitations of the book through deconstructive strategies.
While poststructuralists preferred the more sophisticated term “texts” as opposed to
books, their own writings were entrapped within the medium of the “book.” Yet, the
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only way to transcend the paradox was to call for the destruction of the book, which
possibly implied a destruction of his own writing as well. As Derrida explains:
The idea of the book is the idea of totality ....the idea of the book, which always
refers to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of writing. It is the
encyclopedic protection of theology and of logocentrism against the disruption of
writing, against its aphoristic energy.... If I distinguish the text from the book, 1
shall say that the destruction of the book, as it is now under way in all domains,
denudes the surface of the text. That necessary violence responds to a violence
that was no less necessary (1974, p. 18).
The book in many ways creates borders that circumscribe the infinite play of signifiers
and signifieds. The text, as opposed to the book, is never a totality and affirms its
existence only in relation to an endless chain of subtexts and other texts. Since texts, in
the print medium end up being reified as a book, poststructuralist rhetoric finds itself in
a strange gridlock. Nonetheless, Poststructuralist rhetoric finds its second birth in the
medium of hypertexts and yet, ironically, may face its probable demise at the curious
point of interface between hypertexts and hypermedia, in which the psychedelic
seductive power of images begin to relegate words to second-class citizenship as already
evident from popular culture where the great American Novel has given way to the great
American Screenplay.
Towards a rhetoric of Hypenextuality: Blurring the boundaries between the producer
and the consumer
Joem Utzon’s Sydney Opera House is an idiosyncratic yet brilliant celebration
of asymmetrical, intrepid architecture that smudges the separation between roofs and
walls. Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim museum at Bilbao Spain, a worthwhile progeny of
Dadaism in its embracal of the amorphous and the abstract over symmetry and form
provides another illuminating example of making all sorts of boundaries indistinct The
museum which houses 20th century American and European art is supposedly a meeting
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place for both aficionados and dilettantes alike. Yet, one can never be too sure if people
flock to the Guggenheim museum to either appreciate the works of art housed within
the walls of the building or appreciate the Zeitgeist of the age or the human painters
behind the works or the monument in itself. The blurring of boundaries has been a
recurrent motif of the post-industrial age.
Hypertexts blurs the boundaries between the author and reader in unimaginable
ways. Hypertexts redefines “not only beginnings and endings of the text but also its
borders —its sides as it were” (Landow, 1992, p. 79). Hypertextual writing signifies
the movement from the physical text to the virtual text and creates a borderless text
which poststructuralists have been striving to accomplish in the print tradition.
Hypertext, a term coined by Theodore H. Nelson in the 1960s refers to a form of
electronic text that facilitates a kind of “non-sequendal writing” that “branches and
allows choices to a reader, best read at an interactive screen” (1981, p. 0/ 2).
Hypertexts constitutes a “series of text chunks connected by links which offer the reader
different pathways” (Nelson, 1981, p. 0/2). Landow (1992) considers hypertext to be a
“direct response to the strengths and weaknesses of the printed book” (p. 2). The
printed book while offering the reader conceptual freedom in creating and recreating
interpretations confined the reader both in the visual and spatial realms. The culture of
the printed book is monologic and static. As Ong (1982) points out, hypertexts or
computer writing not only takes back to the dialogic environment of preliterate man but
also creates a “participatory mystique” in “fostering a communal sense” due to “its
concentration on the present moment” (p. 136). Hypertext systems creates a web of
relationships and interrelationships, and inserts every text in such a way as to allow
“nonsequential reading and thinking” (Landow, 1992, p. 82). As Ong (1982) describes
it: “the sequential processing and spatialization of the word, initiated by writing and
raised to a new order of intensity by print, is further intensified by the computer, which
maximizes commitment of word to space and to (electronic) local motion and optimizes
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analytic sequentiality by making it virtually instantaneous" (p. 82). The instantaneity
and all-at-oneness of electronic-mediated communication as present in hypertexts
recreates what Ong construes as the “second orality” in which the interlocutor is not
detached from his or her utterance and yet does not permit the interlocutor’s monopoly
over the utterance. Taylor and Saarinen (1993) consider hypertextual communication as
a means to destabilize the monologic hierarchy of the interlocutor or the high-culture of
the academic who has access to the prestigious printing press:
In a hypertextual environment, all philosophy must be interactive. Monologue
becomes dialogue or, more precisely, polylogue. The disappearance of the
monological voice is a radical revolution in the history of philosophy. What
usually goes unnoticed is that what has traditionally passed for dialogue is
actually monologue. When monologue (even in its dialogic form) becomes
impossible, classical philosophy comes to an end. But the end of the traditional
philosophy is not the end of philosophizing. With the death of the Philosopher,
we all become philosophers with a sense of what matters (the Academy, p. 1).
If Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press facilitated the restoration of the masses to
the “royal priesthood ”where the masses could read the scriptures and interpret it for
themselves, hypertexts have the potential to expand the definition of the philosopher,
poet, broadcaster and so forth to encompass the common person as well through its
interactive environment.
Barthes’ postulation of the writerly text that envisages the reader as the writer
takes place in the hypertextual environment First the reader, can begin by doing
something as simple as changing the font to make reading easier without making
permanent changes to the screen. The Intermedia or Storyspace version of hypertext
allows the reader to read the hypertext book on a large two-page graphic monitor in
which the reader will have the opportunity to juxtapose several texts next to one another.
Upon reaching the note number, the reader can click on the icon which is the hypertext
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equivalent of a reference mark, and move from one link to another. With hypertext, the
main-text can be juxtaposed with a parallel text which is a document of its own right.
Hypertext programs spurs the reader to treat the text as a “field or network of signs in
which to create his or her own linkages” so that the linkages would become an integral
pan of the text and which other readers may follow or change at their own discretion
(Poster, 1995, p. 70). These programs also have the added advantage of permitting
comprehensive searches for phrases or words throughout a text or an entire group of
texts which may later on be added to the text. Poster (1995) suggests that the result is a
“ new text which brings terms together that were not so associated by the author” in an
ingenious way that “the reader has substituted their own hierarchy of terms for that of
the author” (p. 70). Thus, the reader can play the supplementary author in an
hypenextual environment
Landow (1992) argues that an efficient or full hypertextual system would depend
on its one-to-many linking system which permits readers to obtain different information
in so many different ways through multi-sequendal paths and routes. The hypertextual
system that supports branching enhances and multiplies the reader’s choices. The ability
of the reader to visually experience the reconfiguration of the main text in ways s/he
chooses to do so, pertaining to the information that the reader desires creates a variety of
subtexts that stand in direct juxtaposition to the main text. The presence of multiple
texts, some by the reader and some by the author more effectively blurs the boundaries
between the author and the reader than is found in traditional print. The limitless
permutations and combinations that electronic links cause while reading renders more
obscure the notion of the main text, though it seems to be virtually present. The
subsequent creation of multiple texts in contrast to the main texts creates a polyvocal
suffusion of hermeneutical possibilities fulfilling what Derrida’s postulation of
decentering and the end of linear writing. Electronic writing is marked by a “radical
instability” and “interactivity” (Bolter, 1997, p. 269).
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A hypenext is not a closed work but an open fabric of heterogeneous traces and
associations that are in a process of constant revision and supplementation. The
structure of a hypertext is not fixed but is forever shifting and always mobile ....
Branching options multiply, menus reproduce, windows open on other
windows, and screens display other screens in a lateral dispersal that
disseminates rather than integrates. Hierarchy unravels in a web where top and
bottom, up and down lose consistent meaning .... Instead of an organic whole, a
hypertext is a rent texture whose meaning is unstable and whose boundaries are
constantly changing. There is no clearly preestablished path through the
proliferating layers of hypertext. Though the network is shared, the course each
individual follows is different. Thus, no hypertext is the product of a single
author who is its creative origin or heroic architect. To the contrary, in the
hypertextual network, all authorship is joint authorship and all production is co
production. Each writer is a reader and all reading is writing (Taylor and
Saarinen, 1993, telewriting, p. 6).
The lack of a clearly defined preestablished path that the reader has to mandatorily
follow, besides the ability of the reader to create subtexts as he or she reads along avoids
the possibility o f foreclosure that print had institutionalized. Multi-sequential reading in
a hypenext that facilitates its dissemination, is a conscious choice made by the author to
let the reader be his or her own author. Jane Austen’s prophetic words in Nonhanger
Abbev almost 150 years ago amply illustrates the indeterminate nature of hypenexts: “I
leave it to be settled, by whomsoever it may concern, whether the tendency of this work
be altogether to recommend parental tyranny, or reward filial disobedience” (p. 212).
The birth of hypenextual rhetoric occurs only at the peculiar conjunction of the
imaginary point in which the reader’s persona becomes indistinct with the author’s.
Hypenextual authoring that is a collaborative project of the author and the reader usually
lends itself to “filial disobedience” over “patemal tyranny.” The inability of the author to
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calculate the exact path each individual reader will trace places the main text in a
subliminal contest with illimitable alternative texts. Hypertextual rhetoric also
presupposes that the “reader” will take “account of his or her part of the presentation
itself’ (Bolter, 1997, p. 275).
Victory Garden: An Example of hypertextual fiction
Victory Garden is an example of a hypertextual fiction that does not follow a
delineated narrative path. The milieu for this novel is a Southem University in 1991 at
the onset of the Gulf War. Most of the dialogue in this novel takes place in campus
bars, classrooms, bedrooms and so forth. Television plays a major role since the novel
is interspersed with reportage from well-known anchors like Tom Brokaw, Dan Rather
and Peter Jennings, as well as ‘live’ footage on location from Bemard Shaw and Peter
Amett who were holed in the A1 Rashid Hotel in Baghdad.
The novel apparently revolves around the death of Emily Runbird, a graduate
student in cultural anthropology. Emily is killed in active duty during the gulf war.
Emily’s sister Veronica Runbird, on the other hand, has a hard time grappling with the
reality of the war. The perpetual bombardment of images of war on the television screen
makes Veronica wonder if the war was a television production as “some kind of warm
up to the Superbowl.” Further, the novel in itself is intermeshed with various strands
of non-linear narratives: the narrative as created by the media, the individual narratives
of the fictional personae, the hybrid narrative as caused by the marriage between the
two, the narratives of the reader and the author.
Stuart Moulthrop’s hypertextual fiction Victory Garden revisits William
Faulkner’s disjointed narrative in The Sound and the Furv and James Joyce’s stream of
consciousness style of narrative in Ulvsses or Finnegan’s Wake. Moulthrop’s fiction is
interlaced with a story within a story and self-reflexive markers to the hypertextual
medium of the novel. Ironically, one of Emily’s lovers Victory Gardner has a thesis
adviser Boris Uruquhart who is an avid fan of poststructuralism and the aesthetics of
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hypenextual writing. The professor Uruquhan makes extensive reference to the
poststructuralist thought of Borges who is renowned for his Babelic heteroglossia and
polyphonic narratives. In other words, Moulthrop himself seems to be hinting at the
futility of attempting a linear reading of his novel. While Faulkner and Joyce
dexterously labored to create a multidirectional narrative style through the use of
elaborate techniques such as the interior monologue for each character, Moulthrop
creates multiple narratives with a greater economy of words, thanks to hypertexts.
Computers accomplishes for Moulthrop in far lesser time what took years of labor for
both the modernists and the postmodernist novelists who belonged to the print tradition.
Furthermore, the reader of a hypenextual fiction can vinually map the textual contours
since each electronic link is arranged in a multipronged manner that leads to myriads of
other explicit links. While the author uses a linear narrative of strands that appear in a
chronological order, the reader can marinate in an unending chain o f electronic links that
gives rise to an infinity of combinations that the sense of the original text is both
caricatured and lost. In the process of reading, the reader creates his or her own map
that gives birth to a construction of a new text that is composed of fragments of the
original text, if any. In effect, electronic writing continues and intensifies “the tendency
begun with handwriting and print: it enables the removal of the author from the text,
increases both spatial and temporal, of the author from the reader and augments the
problem of interpretations of the text” (Poster, 1995, p. 69). The spatial and temporal
dislocation of the reader from the author as evident in hypertextual writing or fiction
makes the reader the author by default, since s/he mediates the text in his or her own
way impervious of direct authorial influence. Bolter (1991) argues “there is no single
story of which each reading is a version, because each reading determines the story as it
goes.... We could argue that there is no story at all; there are only readings” (p. 124).
The role of the reader in “constructing the story is heightened by the electronic medium,
which, besides creating different possibilities for navigating the story, dematerializes
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the story as an object, makes much more elusive its existence as a physical thing”
(Gaggi, 1997, p. 126).
Although the textual segments undeniably exist in some sense or another, the
nature of their reality is problematic. Is their reality the image on the screen? Or
is it the information in the computer’s memory, which is simply made visible on
the monitor? Or is the story the information on a disk, subsequently read by the
computer and held in its memory? And how should one conceptualize the
actuality of the paths among the different segments? One can imagine the story
as a large diagram consisting of boxes of text with lines in various ways. But
where exactly are those lines, when what they “really” are are digitized
instructions for moving from one area of information to another, and the
electronic information of that information does not look at all like an imaginable
diagram of texts and links (Gaggi, p. 126).
Although one could argue that reading a story in ink and paper is not fundamentally
different from reading a story via hypertexts, the electronic medium in effect actually
provides the reader with the physical sensation of actually creating their own text which
is substantially different from what the author created. The ability to physically
maneuver the text affords both reading and authoring far greater scope than what the
traditional print medium has to offer. The progression of hypenext to hypermedia can
produce a hermeneutical richness of not just words but sounds and images as well.
The interactive rhetor
Hypenexts challenge the notion of wholeness through its interactive medium that
make texts open-ended as opposed to texts that advocate closure. The Aristotelian
notion of structure and wholeness are subvened through hypenextual, interactive
rhetoric. Aristotle in his seventh chapter of Poetics outlined some of the basic principles
that constitute a good plot or a good story:
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Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle and end. A beginning is that
which is not itself necessarily after anything else, and which has naturally
something else after it; an end is that which is naturally after something itself,...
as its necessary or usual consequent, and with nothing else after it; and a middle,
that which is by nature after one thing and also has another after it (p. 1462).
Aristotle suggests that “a well-constructed plot” must “not only present a certain order in
its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain definite magnitude” (p. 1462). Landow
(1992) argues that hypertexts on the contrary, calls into question “(I) fixed sequence,
(2) definite beginning and ending, (3) a story’s “certain definite magnitude,” and
(4) the conception of unity or wholeness” (p. 181). In its place, hypertexts provide “(I)
reader choice, intervention, and empowerment, (2) inclusion of extra-linguistic texts
(images, motion, sound) (3) complexity of network structure and (4) degrees of
multiplicity and variation in literary elements, such as plot, characterization, setting and
so forth” (p. 180). An open-ended, interactive medium defies rhetorical closure,
creating a decentered, continuous network of relationships that evolve incrementally
without a finite point in mind. The subversion of wholeness or closure is an essential
first step in making rhetoric more inclusive. Miller (1990) proposes that hypertextual
writings are “multiple, non-linear, non-causal, non-dialectical and does not fit most
traditional paradigms” for defining rhetorical relationships. Hypertextual rhetoric creates
the possibility of obscuring linear writing by creating a web of complex
intenelationships, fostered by a multicentered interactive ambience.
The discourse emanating from hypertexts is not the product of a single author or
a unified, knowing subject. As Foucault (1966) puts it:
Discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing,
speaking subject, but on the contrary, a totality in which the dispersion of the
subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined. It is a space of
exteriority in which a network of distinct sites is deployed (pp. 54-5).
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Discourse is construed as an interpellation of immeasurable interaction between sign,
signifier and signification, a product of a “network of distinct sites” in the electronic text
“in which the elements of meaning, of structure and of visual display are fundamentally
unstable” (Bolter, 1990, p. 31). Discourse in a medium that “records information by
collecting for fractions of a second evanescent electrons at tiny junctions of silicon and
metal” affirms the Foucaultian suspicion of a thinking, unified subject that is inherently
present within the medium at all time. In other words, the dispersion of the subject in an
inherently unstable medium problematizes the Enlightenment notion of a “sovereign,
founding subject” that is the guiding spirit behind the discourse. Foucault (1988)
summarizes the postmodem hermeneutical suspicion as follows;
I do indeed believe that there is no sovereign founding subject, a universal form
of subject to be found everywhere. I am very skeptical of this view of the
subject and very hostile to it. I believe, on the contrary, that the subject is
constituted through practices of subjection, or in a more autonomous way
through practices of liberation, of liberty.... on the basis, of course, of a
number of rules, styles, inventions to be found in the cultural environment
(Foucault, pp. 50-1).
The reconstitution of the subject in an interactive, hypenextual environment recasts him
or her only in relation to the structures of domination or practices of the medium that act
upon him or her. The presence of other dispersed subjects enhances the interactive
nature of hypenexts, surpassing the linear categorizations of source-message-receiver
paradigm that are symptomatic of traditional mass media situations. For instance, when
the flow of information is unidirectional or top-down as is evident in most television or
radio programming, except perhaps for the interactive talk-show format, the producer
has more control of what is being or will be uttered. More so, there are more practical
reasons why electronic or hypertextual communication is relatively less controlled or
centralized as opposed to older media. Electronic or hypertextual communication not
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only diminishes the barrier between the author and the reader, but is also more amenable
since it is much easier to have one’s own website than produce a television show or
publish a book using the traditional and prestigious print medium due to the prohibitive
costs involved in such an undertaking (Bolter, 1997).
Hypertextual discourse or writing “creates a semiotic blur of cross-referencing”
in which “every word .... is linked to endless chains of reference, which .... are linked
to other referential traces” such that these networks “are not fixed or stable but are
constantly shifting” (Taylor & Saarinen, telewriting, p. 9). The radical instability of
hypenextual or computer writing attenuates “the sense of place.... by the virtual
instantaneous transmission and alteration of words.... into electronic data” (Heim,
1987, p. 22). The instability of the text and the elusiveness of the author may permeate
notions such as the dissipation of the human subject. However, instead of destroying
the human subject as some deconstructors do, this writer will argue for the conception
of the interactive rhetor. The interactive rhetor is neither a mere author nor a reader, but
is a product of information exchange that takes place within a communal network. The
interactive rhetor is in an intermediary phase that stands in between the Enlightenment
construction of the autonomous author and the Barthean formulation of the “death of the
author.” The interactive rhetor mediates on a multivocal text that fulfills Bakhtin’s
(1984) formulation of a dialogic novel which is “constructed not as the whole of a single
consciousness” but is “absorbing other consciousness as objects unto itself.... as a
whole formed by interaction of several consciousnesses” (p. 18). The absence of an
authoritative univocal voice in hypertexts creates a void that is filled by the interactive
rhetor. The notion of an interactive rhetor should not be mistaken for an aberrant
version of textual anarchy bom of out of contextlessness, instead it presumes the
presence of a cosmos of multiple contexts that renders it difficult to attribute a single
author with absolute feudal, hermeneutical power.
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The interactive rhetor is a mediation of several subjects and several concomitant
consciousness interacting upon the apparent “main’ text, appending it and making
sufficient changes to expands its borders indefinitely. The interactive rhetor does not
necessarily, wilfully subvert the context of the discourse, but dispenses with the notion
of a sealed text that impinges on the idea of closure. The interactive rhetor facilitates the
process of an open-ended conversation that can carry on endlessly, unless the
conversing subjects decide to unequivocally put an end to their discourse by electronic
and physical means. The interactive rhetor also represents the revival of oral rhetoric.
Oral rhetoric oscillated between the pictographic and the alphabet Nonetheless, the
community of users shared their rich symbols of images, sounds and words in a
synergistic manner that made learning take place through communal networking.
Lanham (1993) suggests that "the ritualistically silent audience of the nineteenth century”
that was an “audience of readers” is giving way to an “electronic audience” that is
“radically interactive” (p. 76). While Lanham's contention is well-received, the notion
of an ‘audience’ is a misnomer that is a throwback to the spatial and temporal distances
that was legitimated in a top-down, producer/consumer distinction oriented culture.
The interactive rhetor navigates a protean realm of icons, alphabets, images,
sounds and an entire assortment of multi-media devices. The interactive rhetor also
presents the curious interface between a verbal and visual literacy. The so-called
‘audience’ has a form of cross-semiosis of both verbal and visual signs, signifiers and
signifieds. The assemblage of sounds, images and words creates a polyphonic,
heteroglossic and multi-visual that supersedes the classical notion of the text. The
reemergence of iconic and visual representation in an open-ended medium such as
hypertexts or hypermedia, invokes a nostalgic return to the pre-literate, pre-modem days
that Ong (1982) considers the “second orality.” The semblance of retum to the pre
literate days of pictograms reinforces the idea of an interactive rhetor who becomes an
entity that represents the outcome of a collective yet heterogeneous consciousness. The
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birth of the interactive rhetor can occur only at the death of the broadcast model of
communications.
http://www.theconsumerasproducer.com
The website address or the subtitle is non-existent Yet it reflects the tendency
among a growing number of interactive websites on the world wide web that actually
erases the distinction between the producer and the consumer. For instance, there are
many one-hit wonder bands on the music scene. Paying about $15 for a CD that has
one of your favorite songs, only to discover that the rest of the songs are not worth
listening to could be an awful lot of money to waste. A new wave of websites,
however, are taking customization to a newer user-friendly level. At
http://WWW.musicmaker.com , one can assemble and produce a personal album from
over 150,000 tracks, ranging from rock to gospel. One can mix Bach with Puff
Daddy, Led Zepellin or just about any variety at a very nominal cost. In essence, the
consumer plays the producer by proxy by mixing sound tracks and customizing his or
her own CDs. There are also other specialized selections from websites such as
cductive.com that offers a smaller collection of 4,000 titles with an emphasis on techno
or hip-hop or techno.
The emergence of websites such as these are heralding a new wave of
customization in which consumers have far greater creative freedom rather than browse
through a regular music store that has a more producer-controller selection and
sequencing of songs. Quite fortunately, without having to resort to arcane textual
criticism or hypertextual criticism to argue about the relative democratic merits of
cyberspace, users of the web can optimize websites such as these in tangible ways to
reinvent themselves as producers.
Dismantling the Media barricade
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The couch potato is a phenomenon associated with movies and television.
Although it seems a blatant generalization to consider the audience in the passive mode:
the term ‘audience’ in itself, presumes a homogeneous entity that watches a performer or
a group of performers. The passiveness arises from not being the producer or the player
in the show that is being watched. The audience may walk away with a sense
ofcatharsis but yet are denied the exquisite privilege of being the director or an active
player in the production. Will New Media technologies topple the Media barricade and
allow the ‘average Joe or Mary’ to direct and produce a Spielbergian style movie with
all the special effects that usually cost millions of dollars? Without hazarding a guess,
the remote possibility of such events are not altogether fictional. Quitmer (1998) argues
that new media “promises to liberate us from the tyranny of artists who would suck us
into the swirling maw of their moving pictures, music and books ” (p. 211).
Cvberswine is among the first ‘multipath movies’ that lets the viewer to direct
the action. Produced by a Los Angeles based Brilliant Digital Entertainment,
Cvberswine allows the ‘viewer’ to stroll down a narrative path of his or her own
choosing, tweak the animated character making it more aggressive or caring, aggressive
or passive. One can even change the camera angle as one chooses. Or imagine being the
Terminator instead of merely watching it. Through interactive web TVs of the future,
one can interact with the characters through non-linear narratives that do not necessarily
follow a preordained path. New Media technologies carry with it the potential to
democratize EntertainmenL Quittner (1998) makes an interesting distinction between
entertainment in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries:
Entertainment in this century has been mass-produced and broadcast, rigidly
controlled and protected. Media have centralized into the hands of the few;
Hollywood studios, television networks and recording companies carefully
distribute the stuff, cranking out a relatively modest amount of material that will
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be seen by everyone on the globe. But in the next century anyone will be able to
create a movie, music, literature, a magazine or a video game and distribute it as
bits over the network to billions. At least in theory (p. 212).
Some of the above-mentioned futuristic predictions are already rooted in the present.
Cheri Grand, a company spokeswoman for Brilliant Digital Productions, observed that
the company is marketing a developers’ tool kits that “you don’t need any programming
experience” whatsoever to create one’s own interactive cartoons (cited in Quitmer, 1998,
p. 212). While traditional Hollywood studios runs up milions of dollars in overhead and
production costs, the production of computer-based entertainment are relatively cheaper.
However, when the moment arrives in which interactive, non-linear CD-ROM games
can be transposed into the big-screen (if the demand for the big-screen continues), the
so-called ‘viewer’ can have the pleasure of seeing his or her name on the credits as either
director, lead actor or actress or just about anything. Until then, let the lowly ‘viewers’
of the world unite.
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CHAPTER 4
VIRTUAL WORLDS: THE MARRIAGE OF MYSTICISM AND POSTMODERNISM
IN VIRTUAL REALITY
Had we but world enough and time.
This coyness, lady, were no crime.
We would sit down and think which way
To walk, and pass our long love’s day ....
But at my back I always hear
Time’s winged chariot hurrying near.
And yonder all before us lie
Deserts of vast eternity ....
Thus though we cannot make our sun
Stand still, yet we will make him run
Andrew Marvell’s To his Coy Mistress
The poetic persona in Marvell’s poem reminds his lady-love of the unstoppable
forces of death and decay that accompany the irreversible flow of linear clock-time. Yet,
the poet converses within himself that the inevitable can be delayed by making the sun to
run. McLuhan (1964) considers the concluding lines “thus though we cannot make our
sun stand still, yet we will make him run” to be a metaphorical and prophetic allusion to
technologies of high-speed that evolved a few centuries later. The ticking of the clock
has always been a symbolical and literal incantation of humankind’s mortality. Many
religions and philosophies either attempt to reconcile with or transcend the constraints of
linear clock-time. In effect, poets, philosophers and sages for centuries long before the
advent of rocket science dreamed of humankind’s liberation from the spatio-temporal
chains of linearity.
The Hindu sage aspires for moksha (heaven) by circumventing the scourge of
death and decay through belief in the transmigration of the soul via the karmic cycle. The
Buddhist goes a step further, attempting to transcend both karma and samsara (the
indefinite repetition of the karmic cycle) by achieving nirvana - a state that signifies the
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extinction of individual consciousness. The Moslem believes in attaining paradise
through devotion to Allah. The religious syncretist picks fragments from different
religions and hopes to attain a paradise that could be intermediate between the
monotheistic and polytheistic conceptions of Eternity. The Christian considers the
reality of linear clock-time as an intrinsic part of the curse attributed to humanity’s
original transgression against God. Yet, contrary to popular portrayals of Christianity
as a religion of gloom and doom, the Christian seeks freedom through the
substitutionary sacrifice of the Messiah and affirmation in an after-life: “O Death, where
is your sting? O Hades where is your victory?” (I Corinthians 15: 55, New King James
Version).
On the other hand, the secular humanist, the agnostic, the materialist and all the
other people who are satisfied with the here-and-now remain captive to a world
dominated by the senses. The world of sensory perception is in turn inextricably
intertwined with human frailty. Human frailty is reinforced as one’s sensory vitality
diminishes with the passage of time. Nonetheless, it appears that there are surrogate
ways of dealing with mortality, especially for the nonreligious. Science and
Technology, for instance, are relished with almost childish ecstasy by the off-spring of
the Enlightenment as humankind’s only panacea against the tyranny of linear clock-time.
The time-traveler in H.G. Wells’ Time Machine uses his technological gadget to travel
forward and backward in time to visit strange civilizations. The ability to at least
momentarily escape the shackles of clock-time is reminiscent of the act of Prometheus,
the valiant Titan who stole fire from Zeus’ heavens. If Prometheus stole fire, the timetraveler’s technology stole a little grain of immortality from the Divine who is beyond
the confines of time. Similarly, King Nimrod’s abortive Tower of Babel signifies a
primeval desire to conquer space.
Although technologies of high-speed have consistently redefined the frontiers of
time and space, motion only guaranteed movement from point A to point B or C. One
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could never be at points A and B at the same time. The combination of physiological
and space-time differentials make human omnipresence a transcendental fantasy at least
for this present age. However, Virtual Reality machines offer the finest surrogate in
creating a simulacrum of omnipresence. In the future, the ultimate objective of Virtual
Reality, according to its designers, is to eventually build “intelligent autonomous virtual
humans with adaptation, perception, memory” so much so that “these virtual humans
should be able to act freely and emotionally” (Thalman, 1994, p. 2). Imagine having a
live hologram of oneself in virtual space that can simulate the person in a seemingly reallife manner. The simulacrum in Virtual Reality is illusory, but yet, virtually recaptures
the essence of the original almost to its entirety. The VR hologram can help humans
achieve all-at-oneness at least temporarily. Although VR machines are never going to
liberate humans from suffering and death, they can provide humans with a fleeting
sensation of omniscience and omnipresence when a legion of VR personas represent or
re-present the human persona at innumerable places and spaces transcending time, space
and topography.
Virtual Reality causes a lively contest between the simulacrum and the reality
inscribed within linear clock-time. In postmodern parlance, the continuity of the
simulacrum gives birth to an inversion of the hierarchy between the real and the unreal.
In effect, the term unreal can be an inadequate nomenclature for the realm of the virtual.
The term virtual suggests being in essence or effect though not formally recognized or
admitted. In other words, the virtual has not yet been admitted into the realm of the real.
Yet Virtual Reality implies a juxtaposition of seeming contradictions. Paradox might be
a better word to typify this apparent dichotomy that challenges some of the cherished
Cartesian dualisms such as reality versus virtuality. Virtual Reality invokes a
philosophical paradox that cannot be sublated through simplistic either/or binary
formulations. Baudrillard (1994) suggests that the culture of the simulacrum not only
challenges but also threatens to displace the real;
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To dissimulate is to pretend not to have what one has. To simulate is to feign
to have what one doesn’t have. One implies a presence, the other an absence.
But it is more complicated than that because simulating is not pretending;
“Whoever fakes an illness can simply stay in bed and make everyone believe he
is ill. Whoever simulates an illness produces in himself some of the symptoms”
(Littré). Therefore, pretending, or dissimulating, leaves the principle of reality
intact; the difference is always clear, it is simply masked, whereas simulation
threatens the difference between the “true” and the “false,” the “real” and the
“imaginary” (p. 3).
Virtual Reality embraces the culture of the simulacrum by momentarily blurring the
boundaries between virtual presence and actual presence, virtual time and real time,
virtual space and real space. This chapter will explore how Virtual Reality deconstructs
the notion of a stable subject and embraces a postmodern subjectivity that vertiginously
duplicates and replicates sensory experience so as to problematize the boundaries
between the virtual and the real.
Nonetheless, one should not remain content with merely erasing the boundaries
between the virtual and the real. Virtual Reality demands the construction of a virtual
ontology and a virtual rhetoric. The modernist view of ontology centers around
studying Being as an entity that is rooted in linear time and space. On the contrary, the
Christian and the medieval view of ontology revolved around construing Being as an
entity that has its moorings in linear time and space, but yet transcends the time-space
constraints in the spiritual realm. Virtual Reality in many ways has more in common
with either the postmodern simulational culture or a religious mystical experience.
MTT’s Sheridan (1992) suggests that Virtual Reality technologies are defined by
three axes; (a) sensory information, (b) the control of sensors and (c) the ability to
modify or manipulate the environment. Virtual Reality attempts to “map human
perception onto virtual worlds” (Durlach cited in Rheingold, 1991, p. 389). The virtual
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worlds duplicate the real world by generating a convincing simulation that entails the
union of the sensory organs of the user with the output devices of the computer.
Ivan Sutherland, a computer scientist in the 1960s commenting on the limitations
of video monitors back then described; “The screen is a window through which one sees
a virtual world. The challenge is to make that world real, act real, sound real, feel real”
(1965, p. 507). Sutherland’s vision goes far beyond the filmic reality created by a lens
generated camera. A lens-generated camera revolves around the reproduction of a reality
based on an external world. A computer-simulated Virtual Reality need not necessarily
revolve around an external world since the simulacrum of physical reality is a
“consequence of internal processing rather than being something that is developed only
from the immediate sensory information we receive” (Ellis, 1991, p. 323). Virtual
Reality then, has as its manifest goal the ability to engulf the “entire human sensorium”
in a computer-generated illusion viz virtual worlds (Robinett, 1991, p. 19). William
Bricken’s pithy declaration “Psychology is the physics of Virtual Reality” (cited in
Wooley, 1992, p. 21) is an eloquent description of experiencing virtual worlds that exist
only in the minds of the users.
Proprioception and Virtual Bodies
Oliver Sacks (1985) defines proprioception as “that continuous but unconscious
sensory flow from the movable parts of our body (muscles, tendons, joints) by which
their position and tone and motion is continually monitored and adjusted, but in a way
which is hidden from us because it is automatic and unconscious” (p. 14).
Proprioception is an unconscious mental mode that helps us describe the spatial and
relational disposition of one’s body and its parts without even looking at them. With
closed eyes, one could touch and know where one’s thumb, nose etc. is without having
to consciously look for i t Sacks (1985) quotes the philosopher Wittgenstein in pointing
out the fundamental nature of the proprioceptive sense, which is construed as a kind of
hidden sixth sense;
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The aspect of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their
simplicity and language. (One is unable to notice something because it is always
before one’s eyes). The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all
(p. 14).
Sacks (1985) explicates Wittgenstein’s position by offering an interesting analogy of a
woman who lost her proprioceptive sense and was thus unable to move her body under
conscious control. It was only through visual feedback, that is by looking into a mirror
and seeing her reflection was she able to eventually move with conscious volition.
Sacks (1985) vividly illustrates from the above-mentioned analogy that the
proprioceptive sense is best appreciated when lost.
Virtual Reality offers a recurring challenge to the artificial dichotomy between
mind and body. The ancient philosophers such as Socrates held the belief that the body
and sensory perception were obstacles from knowing reality:
And I suppose it (the soul) reasons best when none of these senses disturbs it,
hearing or sight, or pain, or pleasure indeed, but when it is completely by itself
and says good-bye to the body, and so far as possible has no dealings with it,
when it reaches out and grasps that which really is (Socrates, Phaedo, 1956, p.
65).
On one hand, Socrates is right in affirming the metaphysical or religious experience by
acknowledging the soul’s uncanny ability to reason; a belief that goes against the grain
of the cocky skepticism of both the modernist and the postmodernist who have
debunked the existence of the soul or a spiritual realm. On the other hand, Socrates is
incorrect if one were to apply his belief in the physical or virtual realm since most of the
scientific or intuitive ways of knowing are based on sense perceptions. In a Virtual
Reality setting, the divorce between the mind and the body is untenable.
Entering into a Virtual Reality setting can result in a disorientating experience.
Based on sensory data the mind of the user is seduced by the illusion of being in an
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alternative world. Proprioception plays an active role in the cerebral contest between the
real and the virtual in Virtual Reality environment. To understand the phenomenon of
proprioception in redefining the self. Slater and Usoh’s (1994) definition of Virtual
Reality is helpful:
A virtual reality is a real or simulated reality in which the self has a (suspension
o f dis-) belief that he or she is an environment other than that which his/her
body is located. Self perceives sensory information correlated with
propriocepnvely valid feedback about the behaviour and state of his/her body in
that environment (p. 135).
The proprioceptive sense is always reminding us that the body is always present. The
sensory data is negating the presence of the body by simulating its absence. The
proprioceptive sixth sense is entrapped in a delusionary battle with the other five senses
causing a deconstructive aporia in the minds of the user. As Slater and Usoh (1994)
suggest, one of the ways to reduce the contradiction between sensory data and
proprioception is by constructing a virtual body that is “slaved to the available tracking
devices” (p. 129).
Slater and Usoh (1994) conducted an experiment on virtual bodies to determine
how users felt about the juxtaposition of their bodies with virtual bodies in virtual
environments. The researchers used a high-tech DIVISION ProVision200 system that
comprises high-resolution LCDs (liquid crystal devices). Head Mounted Displays and
sensory tracking devices. The real hand of the user was attached to a virtual arm that
can move in perfect alignment with the real arm and wrist. The arm is connected to an
entire but simple body representation that is made complete with two legs and a left arm.
The system perfected the simulation in a real-life manner forward movement is
accompanied by the virtual motion of the artificial legs, movement of the real head
around by more than 60 degrees results in an orientation of the real body and so forth.
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Slater and Usoh (1994) documents some of the difficulties that the participants
felt in momentarily telling the difference between the virtual motion and actual motion of
the bodies. Some of the post-experimental observations were as follows: “In the
computer generated world I had a sense of being there,” “there were times during the
experience when the computer generated world became more real or present for me
compared to the real world” (p. 140). Other responses were as follows: “Sometimes (I
had) a desperate need to actually walk when virtually walking, there does seem to be a
conflict between what the eyes see and the body feels - e.g. my feet appear to be floating
but I can feel my feet on the ground” (p. 135). The responses indicate that either the
virtual blended with the real or caused a disorientating contest with the real. And one
can thus see what postmodernists like Baudrillard mean in his homilies on the
simulacrum, although there are no black and white answers to address the confusion
between the virtual and the real.
Poster (1995) suggests that virtual reality renders reality multiple and
problematizes the notion of “real” reality. Poster (1995) suggests that the simulational
culture makes a startling expose of the limitations of actual reality since there is no sense
of an anchored self or locality in virtual reality. Although virtual reality technologies are
still in its infancy, the virtual worlds they create offer a prelude into the unexplored
realms of the imagination. Virtual bodies displaces the human subject from linear reality
by “taking the imaginary of the word and the imaginary of the film or video image one
step further” and replacing the “individual inside alternative worlds” (Poster, 1995, pp.
30-31).
Towards a virtual ontotheology
Jaron Lanier one of the pioneers of Virtual Reality predicts that virtual reality
“will bring back a sense of shared mystical altered states of reality that is so important in
basically every other civilization and culture prior to big patriarchal power” (cited in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

Taylor & Saarinen, 1993, televangelism, p. 5). Virtual Reality walks hand-in-hand with
both religion and mysticism. As Taylor & Saarinen (1993) describe:
Some of the most intelligent and articulate preachers of the electronic gospel
proclaim a New Age in which not only omniscience and omnipotence but more
important, omnipresence becomes possible. In cyberspace, the limitations of
temporality and spatiality seem to be overcome in an out-of-body experience that
realizes the most ancient dreams of religion. Fleeting electronic images carry the
hope of immortality (televangelism, p. 7).
On one hand, Taylor and his colleague must be exaggerating if they seriously think that
cyberspace is going to liberate humans altogether from time and space. But on the other
hand, Taylor and Saarinen make sense since the simulacrum that virtual reality creates,
appears to have the liberatory potential at least for those fleeting moments when one is in
cyberspace. The medieval monk, the New Age guru, the Jewish rabbi and other
religious figures may have more in common with the simulacrum of transcending the
spatio-temporal dimensions in cyberspace. Yet, there are significant differences
between the religious experience and the VR experience insofar as the substance of the
experience is concerned. Even so, the simulacrum of Vinual Reality leaves room for
crafting a virtual ontotheology that provides a temporary release from the treadmill of
everyday existence. Virtual ontology inhabits the realm of the imagination and not the
actual, physical world. If the function of philosophy, as William James describes “is
the habit of always seeing an alternative,” the function of cyberspace resides in
recreating an “alternate world” that can “evoke in us alternative thoughts and feelings”
(Heim, 1993, p. 136). The alternative experience in Heim’s words are as follows:
The ultimate VR is a philosophical experience, probably an experience of the
sublime or awesome. The sublime, as Kant defined it, is the spine-tingling chill
that comes from the realization of how small our finite perceptions are in the face
of the infinity of possible, virtual worlds we may settle into and inhabit. The
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final point of a vinual world is to dissolve the constraints of the anchored world
so that we can lift anchor - not to drift aimlessly without point, but to explore
anchorage in ever-new places and, perhaps, find our way back to experience the
most primitive and powerful alternative embedded in the question posed by
Leibniz: why is there anything at all rather than nothing? (1993, p. 136).
For the user who precariously straddles the real and the infinitude of virtual worlds, the
secure Being as postulated by the Enlightenment is dispersed into a multiplicity of virtual
selves depending on the number of roles s/he assumes. The virtual culture of the
simulacrum spills over into the real and simultaneously challenges and reinforces the
real. However, the diffusion of the virtual into the real tends to problematize the notion
of a stable subject who until now, fulfilled the grand humanistic project of modernity
that revolved around human mastery. Descartes' contention “I know plainly that I can
achieve an easier and more evident perception of my own mind than anything else”
(1986, p. 22) depicts a confident foundationalist view of the self. In Virtual Reality, the
self becomes a signifier for an infinite signification of virtual selves so much so that the
unified self is momentarily abandoned or dethroned from its privileged seat. The
Cartesian hierarchy of the mind over the body is also displaced in VR because in a
virtual world nothing can be known apart from the senses. Bolter (1996) describes that:
Virtual Reality is the technology for turning Descartes upside down. Its
wandering filmic eye reduces all abstractions to a series of visual perspectives.
What it offers in place of causal thinking is precisely that faculty of imagination
(making images) that Descartes disparages. The goal of virtual reality is not
certainty; it is rather the ability of the individual to empathize through imagining
p. 115).
Bolter explains that Virtual Reality brings about an electronic redefinition of the self
since the self is projected and dispersed in a simulated environment of visual and
sensory impulses. The new possibilities for emotional involvement arc limitless by
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wearing a Virtual Reality helmet: “you can visit the world of the dinosaur, then become a
Tyrannosaurus. Not only can you see DNA, you can experience what it’s like to be a
molecule” (Lanier in Ditlea, 1989, p. 92). To have an emotionally fulfilling VR
experience, it is important to step out of the Cartesian self and immerse oneself in the
graphic virtual environment.
It must be remembered that the body is not physically dispensed with in VR
environments, yet it blends with the environment in apparently indistinct ways. Almost,
as if Hiedegger’s Dasein found a second birth in cyberspace. The “I Am” which one
uses as a form of self-identity is transposed into the “they-self’ of the virtual
environment that is inhabited by other virtual selves. Paradoxically, though one needs
the self to enter a virtual environment. Virtual Reality immersion technologies can
recreate the type of experience that parallels the religious or mystical experience wherein
the meditating self submits to a higher principle or person that transmutes the old self
into a new self. At the risk of sounding facetious, one can cautiously venture to say that
the VR immersion experience is not unlike the transcendental meditation techniques of
Maharishi Yogi who suggested that the key to meditation lies in immersing the self into a
void of emptiness or the Christian conception of crucifying the self for a higher
pleasure. For instance, the late C.S. Lewis professor of medieval literature at Oxford
University in his best-selling book Mere Christianitv describes the Christian way as
follows:
The Christian way is different: harder, and easier. Christ says, “Give me A ll....
I want you. I have not come to torment your natural self, but to kill it. No half
measures are any good. I don’t want to cut off a branch here and a branch
there, I want to have the whole tree down. Hand over the whole natural self, all
the desires which you think innocent as well as the ones you think wicked - the
whole outfit. I will give you a new self instead. In fact, I will give you myself:
my own will shall become yours.” Both harder and easier than what we are all
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trying to do .... Christ Himself sometimes describes the Christian way as very
hard, sometimes as very easy. He says “Take up your Cross” -- in other words,
it is like going to be beaten to death in a concentration camp. Next minute, he
says, “My yoke is easy and my burden light.” He means both. And one can
just see why both is true (1960, p. 8).
Although one can easily distinguish between a rather unique spiritual experience such as
following Jesus and immersing oneself in a Virtual Reality environment, there are quaint
similarities between the two that almost seems bizarre. While a spiritual experience
demands a negation of the old self in favor of a new, immersion in VR environments
negate the Enlightenment stable self for a new self or selves that challenges the
boundaries between the material and the immaterial, the virtual and the real, the rational
and the sensual. The recreation of virtual selves provide a shimmering, yet fleeting
glimpse of immortality that can provide momentary release for those who are
consistently tyrannized by reality.
Virtual Embryos, L-Systems and Artificial Life
Dolly made the covers of many magazines and newspapers across the globe.
Why did a cuddly, harmless looking sheep cause both concern and hysteria? The
difference between Dolly and the rest of her kind lies in the fact that Dolly is a cloned
sheep. The ability to clone a sheep, as experts suggest, is an indication that human
cloning is a realistic possibility. On June 7,1997 the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, to alleviate public fear, issued its recommendations regarding human
cloning. It recommended a ban on all attempts to create a child through cloning or
“somatic cell nuclear transfer” and urged that “the current moratorium on federal funding
of human cloning research be continued” requesting private agencies to refrain from
such work (http://www.usfca.edu/cloning). However, it recommended that the human
cloning issue be reexamined after studying its implications for about three to five years.
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Having human clones that are exact replicas of a person can be unsettling to
one’s mind. However, virtual clones can be both aesthetically pleasing and sensually
enticing. Virtual clones or virtual beings are products of Artificial Life. The expression
Artificial Life in itself is an oxymoron because artificial is synonymous with the
synthetic whereas life pertains to the organic or natural. The combination of the two is a
provocative way of depicting the philosophical and scientific confusion that relates to the
definition of life and reality. Philosophers have grappled with reality in pronouncedly
different ways. Plato suggests that the ideal forms of a represented object constitutes the
"really real” and subordinates the raw physical forces of nature. Aristotle denigrates
Plato’s ideal ideas and prefers the individual substances one touches and deals with as a
better depiction of reality. The medievalists attach symbolical significance to real things.
The biblical/religious attach supematural layers of meaning to reality granting the
spiritual precedence over the material. The Renaissance counts something as real only if
it is observable by the senses which automatically disqualifies the unobservable realms.
The modem period, as Heim (1993) describes it “attributes reality to atomic matter that
has intemal dynamics or energy,” nonetheless the reality question was “doomed by the
analytical drive of the sciences towards complexity and by the plurality of artistic styles”
(p. 116). Freud’s critique of an unified consciousness, Einstein’s theory of relativity,
the discoveries of New Physics, the Dadaists, the postmodernists have all in their own
respective ways rendered the notion of a stable reality or a stable truth problematic.
Problematizing the notion of a stable reality may at times problematize the definition of
life. For instance, the Pantheistic notion of life is radically different from the JudeoChristian or scientific conception of life. However, without getting into a philosophical
quagmire over the issue of inanimate objects being granted life status, this study for the
sake of expedience would equate life with living beings that can breathe, move, talk etc.
Virtual Reality machines, in effect, are intricately connected with the notion of
Artificial Life. Artificial life is related to “Embryonics.... a basis of natural mechanisms
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of development of living mulricellular beings” (Thalman, 1994, p. 2). Artificial life is
based on the notion of creating virtual humans. Artificial life comprises “realistic
modeling of people’s behavior, including interactions with each other and with the
human user” (Thalman, 1994, p. 2). Thalman (1994) identifies a few traits that are
characteristic of virtual humans i.e. they are simulated people rather than cartoon-type
characters, they inhabit three-dimensional worlds, they can interact with the user and are
realistic models of people’s visual appearance including clothes and hair. Virtual
humans are modeled on actual humans with the ultimate objective of simulating
“behavior, intelligence, autonomy, adaptation, perception, memory, freedom, emotion,
consciousness, unpredictability and presence” (Thalman, 1994, p. 2). Reynolds
(1987) introduced the term and concept of behavioral animation. Behavioral animation
when applied to virtual humans as in interactive games, facilitates autonomous human
like behavior in order to maintain the illusion in the user that the virtual humans are real
ones. Starting with Sega to more complex video/virtual reality games the key is to
enhance the simulacrum through behavioral animation to the highest level. For the
basketball fan playing a VR game, the important thing is to trick him or her into feeling
that he or she is actually playing with a NBA or WNBA star. The virtual Michael
Jordan or Scottie Pippen is thus up for a game of ball in a simulated environment that
duplicates the high-drama and tension that accompanies an actual game.
However, the notion of Artificial Life attempts to accomplish far more than what
interactive games can offer. The objective of Artificial Life is to attribute a behavior or
behaviors to each virtual object in the virtual world. Dead objects such as stones etc.
may move around when physical forces act upon i t Humans, animals and other living
creatures respond both to physical laws such of motion, gravitation etc. but also to
biological laws of reproduction and so forth. A computer-generated virtual world has to
present an alternative universe that simulates and recreates these conditions in virtual
environments. To achieve virtual verisimilitude, computer engineers have devised L-
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systems, a technical term that describes a mechanism that can recreate force fields,
synthetic vision and high-level physical and behavioral animation. Pmsinkiewicz and
Lindenmayer (1990) have employed L-systems as a means of visually simulating the
development and growth of living organisms. It is thus possible to make a virtual tree
respond to the forces of virtual gravity or allow the simulation of tropism (an
involuntary reflex reaction to external stimuli) which is responsible for the bending of
branches towards light sources. Behavioral animation is a highly effective way of
modeling an “instinct driven, animal behavior” for a large number of “actors forming
schools, herds or flocks” (Noser à Thalman, 1994, p. 47). Noser and Thalman (1994)
suggest that the combination of synthetic vision and behavioral animation is a first step
in simulating human behavior and creating the virtual human.
The goddess Aphrodite in response to Pygmalion’s prayer breathed life into the
gorgeous female sculpture Galatea. The metamorphosis of Galatea into a human being
is a mythical precursor for computer-generated simulations that become virtual
equivalents of real humans. Real humans display autonomous behavior that consists of
abilities to rationalize, display emotions etc. Ultimately, virtual humans should be able
to behave autonomously if Artificial Intelligence theorists and designers promise to
deliver the utopia that popular culture has been depicting through movies for the past
few decades. As Thalman (1994) points out the technology of L-systems are already
moving in the direction of simulating human behavior in such a way to make Baudrillard
and cyberpunk writers happy. It must be noted that this study made reference only to Lsystems being developed by researchers at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.
In the same token, it must be added that there are a host of other mind-boggling systems
evolving in the same direction, being developed at places far and wide, from the
prestigious MIT’s Media Lab to institutions outside the United States.
Virtual Reality Immersion Experience and postsymbolic communication
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Immersion is a term that pertains “to the degree to which a virtual environment
submerges the perceptual system of the user in computer-generated stimuli" such that
“the more the system captivates the senses and blocks out stimuli from the physical
world, the more the system is considered immersive” (Biocca & Delaney, 1995, p. 57).
Immersion is an outlet through which the virtual environment bombards the senses “to
fool eye and mind into seeing.... worlds that are not and never can be” (Brooks, 1988,
p. 1). The VR immersion experience constitutes a form of postmodem seduction; an
experience that bypasses the linear, logical and rational mindset for a phantasmagoria of
high-speed images and sounds. The immersion experience fulfills Coleridge’s
definition of art as “a willing suspension of disbelief’ since the power of seduction
momentarily stifles the voice of reality. The assault on reality by the seductive power of
the simulacrum concocts a virtual surrealism that displaces order and rationality in favor
of flux. In Baudrillard’s words:
Seduction, however, never belongs to the order of nature, but that of artifice never to the order of energy, but that of signs and rituals. This is why all the
great systems of production and interpretation have not ceased to exclude
seduction ... from their conceptual field. For seduction continues to haunt them
from without, and from deep within its forsaken state, threatening them with
collapse .... Seduction continues to appear to all orthodoxies as malefic and
artifice, a black magic for the deviation of all truths, an exaltation of the
malicious use of signs, a conspiracy of signs. Every discourse is threatened
with this sudden reversibility, absorbed into its own signs without a trace of
meaning (1990, p. 2).
The actualization of the immersion experience emanates from the seduction that
Baudrillard projects as a type of absorption that does not leave behind a trace of
meaning. Bolter (1996) suggests that virtual reality in effect “constitutes the inversion
of the figure of ekphrasis” (p. 118). While ekphrasis subordinated perception to
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language. Virtual Reality on the other hand “subordinates language to visual perception”
(Bolter, 1996, p. 118).
In an immersive virtual reality system, users wear stereoscopic head-mounted
displays that helps immerse a number of the senses in computer-generated stimuli. The
physical media such as the interactive, 3-D computer screen in conjunction with the
sensorimotor channels of the user creates a computer interface with the human body and
senses that results in virtual worlds contrived by the senses and only really exists in the
minds of the users. The interface is complete when the whole body of the user is
transformed into an input device (Krueger, 1991). The evolution of VR immersive
experience reaches its zenith when physical motion, facial expressions, eye movements
and unconscious physiological processes act in consonance with the computer.
Virtual worlds are simulations of human interactions with the physical world.
Conscious and unconscious bodily motion or intemal metabolism such as heartbeat or
blood pressure can become potential computer input. The computer is sensitized to the
user, almost as an extension of the central nervous system. The immersion experience
is “a psychological threshold, a point at which our perceptual systems are so immersed
in the simulation that the user already begins to feel” present in an “all-inclusive....
sensory illusion o f .... another environment, another reality” (Biocca & Delaney, 1995,
p. 63). The key to defining virtual reality in terms of the immersion experience is the
concept of telepresence. While presence can be thought of as “the experience of one’s
physical environment” not referring to one’s immediate surroundings, but to the
“perception of those surroundings as mediated by both automatic and controlled
processes,” telepresence is defined as “the experience of presence in an environment by
means of a communication medium” (Steuer, 1995, p. 36). Telepresence occurs when
perception is mediated by a communication technology so much so that one begins to
perceive two separate environments simultaneously i.e. the physical environment in
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which one is actually present and the virtual environment in which one is virtually
present.
The telepresence enhances the simulacrum, making the simulacrum a being unto
itself as opposed to being in representation of another viz the extemal environment. As
Baudrillard (1983) explains:
Thus perhaps at stake has always been the murderous capacity of images,
murderers of the real, murderers of their own model as the Byzantine icons
could murder the divine entity. To this murderous capacity is opposed the
dialectical capacity of representations as a visible and intelligible mediation of the
R eal.... But what i f ... the whole system becomes weightless, it is no longer
anything but a giant simulacrum, never again exchanging for what is real, but
exchanging for itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or
circumference .... So it is with simulation, insofar as it is opposed to
representation. Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting
it as a false representation, simulation envelopes the whole edifice of
representation as itself a simulacrum (pp. 10-11).
The simulacrum goes through four successive phases that makes it distinct or unique
from the representation of the real. First, it appears as a reflection of a basic reality.
Second, it masks and perverts a basic reality. Third, it masks the absence of a basic
reality. Fourth, it bears no relation to any reality whatsoever it is its own pure
simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1983). Telepresence fabricates the simulacrum of a
multisensory experience that has a world and reality of its own. Telepresence neither
inhabits the world of the real or the unreal, but the world of the virtual where the user
could recreate and enter manifold virtual worlds, assume animate and inanimate
personas viz. be a molecule, a machine, a NBA star etc.
The task of telepresence in “transporting experience” is present in other media as
well. However, telepresence in virtual environments transports one into the realm of
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“post-symbolic communication” (Lanier & Biocca, 1992). Lanier (1992) employed the
term “postsymbolic communication” to suggest a communicative shift in which the
simulated thing is an entity unto itself as opposed to being an impoverished symbol
representing something else. The birth of the postsymbolic occurs at an epochal
moment when the teleological question is problematized. The symbolic is easily
traceable when the impulse of the physical world is stronger than that of the virtual
world being simulated. For instance, when the United States Air Force created virtual
terrains of enemy territory to train its pilots in aerial warfare, the virtual terrain was
construed as a symbol for an extemal referent in the physical world. However,
symbolic communication becomes more difficult when the same technology is
decontexmalized from its earliest applications.

The movement of this technology from

a military to a civilian setting obfuscates teleology in a more radical way. The signifier
is removed from the signified -- that is the signified in the original setting - and in its
place one has a series of signifieds each of which claiming autonomy from an extemal
referent To illustrate the above-mentioned shift from the symbolic to the postsymbolic,
it is useful to take note of Air Force VR pioneer Tom Furness' remarks at a Virtual
Reality Annual Symposium: “advanced interfaces will provide an incredible new
mobility for the human race. We are building transportation systems for the senses ...
the remarkable promise that we can be in another place or space without moving our
bodies into that space” (1993, p. i). Furness’ dreams are already being realized as
NASA is constantly improvising virtual reality gadgets as means of transmitting the
phenomenon of being telepresent on distant planets (McGreevy, 1993). Exploring
distant planets in VR settings can create a simulacrum of the actual planets. Yet
telepresence affords only a simulation of the real. Nonetheless, as Baudrillard (1983)
proposes the simulation engulfs the whole representation of the simulated objects as a
simulacrum unto itself. In other words, the VR user is not exploring actual planets but
virtual ones. The virtual planetary exploration are self-referential figments of the
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multisensory simulation of a transponational experience. In fact, the effectiveness of
the simulation largely depends on its ability to create a simulacrum of the highest order,
a sensory and spatial verisimilitude that can exist in Baudrillard's words “in an
uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference” (1983, pp. 10-11). The
existence o f the simulacrum as a being unto itself, marks the beginning of
postsymbolical communication where referential!ty gives way to free-play.
A Rhetoric of Media Aesthetics
Taylor and Saarinen (1993) argue for the formulation of a new discipline known
as media philosophy or imagology. They articulate that imagology is a new media
philosophy insisting that the “word is never simply a word but is always also an image”
(styles, p. 3). In imagologist parlance, the word is an an “audio-visual trace” that
follows the “lead of deconstruction by giving up the search for secure foundations” so
much so that the “disappearance of the signified in the endless field of signifiers is
embraced” and “affirmed in its creative richness” (styles, p. 9). While Taylor and
Saarinen should be complimented for their ingenuity, they nonetheless stick to the
beaten path of traditional academia. The very use of the term “media philosophy” is an
indication that both Taylor and Saarinen are unwittingly buying the conventional
academic notion that has always privileged philosophy or critical analysis over art,
poetry, aesthetics, intuition, mysticism and so forth. This study modestly argues that
the time has come to open the doors of the academia for the mystic, the poet, the aesthete
and all the others who have been excluded by the linear tradition of the academia for the
past few centuries. The rationalists, the logical positivists, the structuralist, the classical
rhetoricians and others have exalted a synthetic order of learning in a controlled
environment as opposed to intuition, story-telling, contemplation and free-play of the
mind.
In many ways, even the poststructuralists who promised deliverance from the
tyranny of the formulary logic of the Enlightenment tradition have privileged the
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philosophers of language or the literary critic over the poet, the artist, the monk and
lesser mortals who care less about theory or critical rigor. This study instead argues in
favor of a virtual or media aesthetics that is more radical than a word-based
poststructuralism and yet more old-fashioned than the Enlightenment. Although
aesthetics has conventionally been classified as one of the branches of philosophy it
misbehaves like an illegitimate or adopted problem-child that causes a profound
embarrassment to its foster parent Aesthetics simultaneously embraces the pristine
beauty o f nature, the irrational and the untamed forces of the imagination as opposed to
equanimity or a predilection for order that characterizes most philosophers.
The rhetoric of media aesthetics has to at least momentarily follow in the
footsteps of poetry and art instead of criticism or analysis. Poetry and art are better
companions than philosophy or critical analyses since virtual worlds occupy the ethereal
and figurai realms of the imagination. Virtual reality open-heaitedly returns to the
aesthetics of the primordial human, the primitive impulse that unabashedly partakes in
the sense of joy and mystery that surrounds the universe. Aesthetics is rejuvenated in
virtual reality and can no longer be ignored, especially after having been sanitized and
sterilized by the clinical practitioners of academic formalism for an unusually long period
of time. The British romantic poet John Keats effusively lamented the loss of
aestheticism due to the excesses of “cold philosophy” as follows;
Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven:
We know her woof, her texture; she is given
In the dull catalogue of common things.
Philosophy will clip an Angel’s wings.
Conquer ail mysteries by rule and line.
Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mineUnweave a rainbow, as it erewhile made
The tender-person’d Lamia melt into a shade.
In the context of this poem that bewails the loss of mystery and beauty, thanks to the
hard-nosed sciences (formerly considered to be a branch of philosophy) Keats attacks
Newton who “destroyed the poetry of the rainbow by reducing it to a prism” (cited in •
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Abrams, 1953, p. 309). Here one can easily discern that Keats’ scientific ignorance is
strikingly deplorable. Yet his poetic genius compensates for his ran tings against "cold
philosophy” which makes him a worthy candidate to receive forgiveness from History:
past, present and future. Even so, Keats is vindicated. Not with regard to Sir Isaac
Newton by any mean stretch of the imagination. But against the likes of Bertrand
Russel] and other logical positivists, of whom reams have been written concerning their
disregard for aesthetics.
Keats and the other romantics along with the ancients were the founding fathers
and mothers of what this study postulates -- Media Aesthetics. Media aesthetics
encompasses not just the verbal signifier but also the visual and the acoustic signifier.
Media aesthetics is an alternative route that rhetoricians may pursue in which the freeplay of the signifier encompasses not merely the textual or the linguistic but also the
plethora of sights and sounds. Media aesthetics typifies the type of experience related
with watching a special effects movie in which the images and computer graphics are as
important, if not more important than the plot. Media aesthetics should not follow the
Kantian notion of the aesthetic as a “disinterested play of the senses” or even the
Hegelian conception of the rational progression of humanity through an unified Idea
since the rhetoric of Media Aesthetics is neither veridical nor representational as it does
not display filial obedience to actual reality. Media aesthetics, for the lack of a better
word, is the soul of virtual reality wherein one’s experience per se is more important
than a critical cognition of that experience. The Virtual Reality experience invites the
user to drown himself or herself in a pollyannish carnival of the senses. The key is to
sit back and indulge in the richness o f the multisensory experience as opposed to a
meticulous critical dissection (which also has its place in other contexts) of the virtual
reality experience. The media aesthete will be committing aesthetical suicide if s/he
attempts to ape the mathematical logic of academic formalism. In other words, virtual
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reality is a simple invitation for people to immerse themselves and enjoy; rather than
dissect and tear apart.
Even while using critical tools such as deconstruction, the study does not seek to
dismantle, but disperse the secure Enlightenment subject. Dispersion of the subject in a
postsymbolic, decentered electronically mediated communication is necessary to
pronounce the birth of the Media Aesthete. Instead of anchorlessness, the dispersed
subject is caught in a continues process of reanchoring in a multitude of virtual worlds.
Each vinual world tells a story that is accessible and comprehensible only to the
individual user. The Media aesthete’s rhetoric thus becomes a rhetoric of re-creation not
very unlike the poet who writes a poem or a musician who composes a symphony. The
concluding lines of Keats’ poem “Ode on a Grecian Um” which goes ‘Beauty is truth,
and truth beauty’ summarizes one of the tenets of media aesthetics. All the remaining
tenets are ‘up for grabs.’
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: AN ALTERNATIVE RHETORIC
Can a human being be justified in looking upon his times as evil, or is not a
human being, as a human being, precisely so relative in relation to other people
that there can be at the most be talk of their weakness and mediocrity?.... If it
were possible for a human being to be in absolute possession of the truth, then it
would be absolutely indefensible, an infînite guilt (to compromise the truth)
because He who is the Truth cannot yield the least bit But there is indeed no
human being who is in this situation, least of all in relation to other people.
Every human being is himself a sinner. He thus relates not as a pure one to
sinners, but as a sinner to sinners •• Soren Kierkegaard.
If the modernist displays an anthropocentric hubris that attributes mastery to the
human subject, the postmodernist displays an iconoclastic hubris through mastery of
intricate, deconstructive language games. Kierkegaard’s humble plea to the selfrighteous pietists of his time holds true even now, especially in the arena of academic
scholarship. Bearing this in mind, this study proceeds to demystify any pretensions
whatsoever of having addressed questions pertaining to cyberculture with decisive
finality borrowing Kierkegaard’s notion of the impossibility for any human to be in
“absolute possession of the truth.” More so, in the context of this study, cyberspace
represents a social space simmering in a perennial flux that moves exponentially along
with technological change. The rapid evolution of new communication technologies
makes communication inquiry open-ended as opposed to a sealed scholarship that claims
to possess definitive answers. Needless to say, this study nonetheless raises pertinent
questions about the epistemic shift in one’s perception of the self in electronic mediated
communication and demonstrates how the reconstitution of the self in an atomistic
medium requires the construction of a new rhetoric since the old models pertain to old
media situations.
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The purpose of this study, in retrospect, was to show how cyberspace
deconstructs the Enlightenment view of the secure, stable subject and in turn, articulate
new rhetorical strategies to address an increasingly decentered communication network.
The electronic redefinition of the self is a process of destabilizing the self that has been
going on in the visual arts throughout the 20th century, however, the process is
accelerated with the interactive communication network that reconstitutes the self in an
irretrievable interface with other mediating consciousnesses. By far the postmodern
extrapolation of the self into the matrix of a decentered network and other selves
problematizes and even supersedes the paradigm of the broadcast model of
communication that is both top-down and Source-Message-Receiver oriented.
Interactivity as demonstrated in chapter 3 pushes the boundaries between the producer
and consumer, the author and reader into the background, rendering discourse openended and relatively more democratic.
In this study, deconstruction is employed as a critical tool, not necessarily in a
nihilistic sense, but as a rhetorical bridge to partake in the illimitable, cosmic dance of
the verbal, acoustic and visual signifiers that gives birth to a postsymbolical
communication without frontiers. Resultantly, new rhetorical strategies are needed, not
to domesticate the signifier into the confines of a linear reality, but to explore the
otherness of virtual worlds which cyberspace is beckoning us to embrace. As Taylor
and Saarinen (1993) explain: “deconstruction” pertains to “giving up the search for
secure foundations” that implies an inrinite scope for free-play (Styles, p. 9).
Deconstruction is used as an emancipatory as opposed to a nihilistic tool in seeking
anchorage in virtual worlds that is situated in the realm of the figurai and poetic. The
social realism of the bourgeoisie anchors human experience within the perimeters of
linear time and space. Cyberculture outstrips the quotidian reality of the bourgeoisie and
situates communication in an age of suspension between the moorings of a constantly
shifting socio-cultural reality and the liminal transience of virtual environments in which
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the borders between imagination and reality are collapsing. On one hand, cyberspace is
the product of human ingenuity in a linear time-span. Yet, it breaks away from any rigid
categorization of reality. As Heim (1998) describes:
Culture evaporates into transmissible bits, fragments increasingly distinguishable
from noise. The information flood sweeps away coherence in the wobbling
worlds of print and film. The digital era splatters attention spans until the shared
sensibility dribbles into piecemeal, disintegrative de-construction (p. 89).
Cyberculture disseminates the deconstruction of a linear culture at a rapid pace, and
facilitates the reconstruction of digital fragments into “virtual worlds” that “do not seek
to re-present the primary physical world, nor to borrow integrity by imitation or
photorealism” (Heim, 1998, p. 89). Even while simulating the physical world, as
opposed to directly representing it, one could say that cyberspace shares common terrain
with the psychological realism of the mind more than a social realism that is based on
concrete social strucmres. Reality in cyberspace is a synthetic construction weaved out
of work and play having a distinctive alternative entity. The altemateness or otherness
of cyberspace comes from the repudiation of a photorealistic depiction of the physical
world. Cyberspace in many ways is reminiscent of Mary Shelley’s Active creation - i.e.
Frankenstein’s monster that consumes its own creator. Apparently, the imagery is less
violent in cyberspace. However, cyberspace moves beyond the realm of the socially
real and embraces the psychologically real viz. imagination even while paying homage to
the socio-cultural and technological determinants that brought it into being.
Cyberspace marks the transition from a symbolic to postsymbolic
communication, if one were to construe it as an alternative, virtual world. At this
juncture, one might ask the rhetorical question as to what constitutes a ‘world’ along
with the cyber-philosopher Michael Heim:
What makes a world? How does a world exist as a world? A world is not a
collection of fragments, nor even an amalgam of pieces. It is a felt totality
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or whole. You cannot make a world by patching together this part and the other,
because the wholeness, not so much its particulars, makes the world exist. Nor
can we create a world simply by mirroring the primary world. If virtual design
pictures the primary world of nature, the illusion might suggest an integral
feeling, but soon enough the mirage slips to betray the cracks in the digital
environment. A nature-referenced world avoids the active human synthesis, and
it also avoids discovering what makes the natural world a world in the first
place. The wholeness of the virtual world cannot be borrowed from the already
existing physical world (1998, p. 90).
Heim (1998) answers the question by using Hiedegger’s notion of
Bewandtniszusammenhang , which means a “context of relationships” (p. 90).
Hiedegger defines worldhood or the worldliness of the world in the context of
interrelationships. “World” is a verbal notion that denotes a continual link of one thing
with another the “nail belongs to the hammer, which belongs in turn to the hand, which
belongs to the arm, which belongs to the person whose intention is to get the job done
and so on” (Heim, 1998, p. 90). The “World” thus constitutes a “web-like totality” that
weaves things together (p. 90). In a similar token, cyberspace constitutes a virtual
world of its own possessing the same internal dynamics of complex interactions that
take place in the real world. While possessing the same dynamics, cyberspace is not a
mirror reflection of the real world nor is the process of signification in its medium
chained to the materiality of the real as opposed to the immateriality of its own.
Nonetheless, at the risk of being elliptical or contradictory it must be explained that
Cartesian dualisms such as materiality versus immateriality were employed only with
regard to explaining a cotnmonsensical difference between the virtual and the real.
Bearing this in mind, this study in the previous chapters proceeded to articulate new
rhetorical strategies in the wake of the deconstruction of the Enlightenment which will be
sununarized in the ensuing section.
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Summary
The common thread or theme that ties chapters 2, 3 and 4 together has two
strands: a) how cyberspace deconstructs the Enlightenment human subject and
disperses him or her in an inherently unstable medium and b) the new rhetorical
strategies that are developed to meet the resultant philosophical exigencies. Chapter 2
deals with the notion of role-playing and postmodern subjectivity accomplished through
Multi-User Simulated Environments and the resultant dissipation of the Cartesian cogito
amid a multiplicity of selves. The Self is reconstituted in illimitable ways transcending
the limitations of the physical self. Chapter 2 discusses a Star Trek MUSE in which the
player can assume several personas, create their own character sketch and mediate
through several strands of reality. The player in a deconstructive act dispenses with his
or her cogito to reconstitute himself or herself anonymously through several other
personas. MUSEs, as this chapter argues, consummate the postmodern quest for
subjectivity, achieving both detemporalization and decontextualization of the linear
reality in favor of virtual time and virtual space. MUSEs facilitate anonymity for the
real-life persona and place the player in an active role of the creator.
Chapter 2 also highlights how digital identities create a paradox that challenges
the notion of the uniqueness of the self. As Barnes (1996) suggests “the cultural
acceptance of digital personalities opens up the possibility of personality duplication and
memory alteration” (p. 202). Memory alteration is possible since memories in digital
formats can be enhanced, augmented, changed or even erased that Springer (1993)
declares: “Since memories form the foundation of human identity, loss of memory is
equivalent to loss of self.... it suggests that advanced technologies can potentially be
used to destroy human uniqueness” (p. 203). Although there is insufficient scientific
evidence to back up the claims of computers erasing human memory, cyber theorists use
the notion of cyborg to suggest that a McLuhanish prosthesis of computer devices into
the human body can problematize the boundaries between human personas and the
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digital ones. This chapter demonstrates how cyberculture brings to the foreground a
crisis in philosophical humanism. The humanism of the Enlightenment placed the
human at the center of everything; that is through cognition and progress one could
achieve a mastery of every situation. Machines that are a product of human efforts,
appears to possess the simulacrum of a life of their own, especially in the context of
cyberculture. Cyborg Action which is an essential part and parcel of popular culture,
witnessed in films such as Robocop and Terminator show how digital or robotic
creatures simulate human behavior to perfection almost to the point of making one
wonder if humans are more unique than robots or digital personas.
Chapter 3 is a continuation of the dispersion of the Enlightenment human subject
in cyberspace. The Enlightenment subject has been valorized as the autonomous author
or the human agency that caused a particular work. In the broadcast model of
communications, the Enlightenment subject is recast as the producer. This chapter
demonstrates how hypertexts which are virtual texts blurs the boundaries between the
author and the reader in hitherto, inconceivable ways through its interactive medium that
postulates an open-ended discourse as opposed to a closed one. However, merely
deconstructing the boundaries can be misconstrued as being nihilistic. Instead, this
chapter is reconstructivist in postulating the notion of the Interactive Rhetor. The
interactive rhetor is an alternative or intermediary phase that occupies a conceptual space
between the Enlightenment construction of the autonomous author and the Barthean
formulation of the ‘death of the author.’ The interactive rhetor is a rhetorical formulation
constructed to address the absence of an univocal, authoritative voice in hypertexts. The
interactive rhetor is an explanatory notion to show that discourse is not the construction
of a single consciousness, but the outgrowth of several mediating consciousnesses that
takes place in an open-ended setting.
The interactive rhetor follows the lead of the Barthean notion of the ‘writerly
text’ in which the reader moves from being a passive participant who interprets a text
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already written, to being an active participant in the authoring process. Hypenextual
writing or telewriting, as Taylor and Saarinen (1993) describe it: “corrupt the modernist
search for purity .... In the world of hypertexts, art forms are not autonomous but
overlap without end .... Word, image and sound intersect in the bowels of the machine
and are projected in such a way that one must look and read simultaneously”
(telewriting, p. 6). The open-ended intertextual and hypertextual medium that involves
extra-linguistic features forestalls the possibility of an univocal hermeneuric. The notion
of autonomy gives way to a new interactivity that constitutes an assemblage of several
consciousness and several subjects. The interactive rhetor who is neither mere reader
nor author is the product of several subjects mediating with each other, enhancing the
discourse interminably in a medium that is intrinsically deconstructing the distinctions
between the author and the reader and the producer and the consumer.
Chapter 3 discusses Moulthrop’s hypertextual fiction Victorv Garden as a text
that permits the reader with an authoring experience. Each individual reader can follow
electronic links as s/he chooses without necessarily sticking to the original text. In the
first place, the author’s intended narrative path is hidden from the reader in a sense that
the reader can only follow the links the way s/he chooses to do so since the statistical
probability o f figuring out the exact narrative structure of the author is remote. In effect,
one could say that hypertexts prevent the author from valorizing a particular narrative
path or that authors use hypertexts plainly to create multiple narrative paths. Either way,
the readers indulges in an authoring experience that leads to the construction of several
stories instead of one and several plots as opposed to one. The new-found fieedom of
the reader in a position of authoring smears the borders between the author and the
reader more remarkably than any postmodern theorist could ever wish.
The interactive rhetor is postulated not necessarily in a formulary sense, but
more as an alternative rhetorical strategy or as an incubating apostrophe that awaits the
birth of a totally interactive era of communications which will be a historical
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discontinuity from the hierarchical present that privileges the author over the reader and
the producer over the consumer. Hj^penextual environments facilitate alternative
epistemological conceptions such as the interactive rhetor, although it must be
acknowledged that the interactive rhetor precariously straddles the realm of reality on
one side, and the realm of the imagination on the other. The above-mentioned statement
was made given the fact that one still lives in a period that is dominated by top-down
media situations. However, the interactive rhetor accomplishes the disintegration of the
unified Cartesian ego in a profound way as it is dispersed "by bits and bytes of
information” through “the electronic nervous system of the network” (Barnes, 1996, p.
212) inhabited by several mediating consciousness.
Chapter 4 explores how Virtual Reality machines causes a spirited contest
between the simulacrum and real. Chapter 4 employs Baudrillard’s notion of the
simulacrum to demonstrate how Virtual Reality problematizes the boundaries between
the virtual and the real. The Virtual Reality immersion experience enables the user to
delve into virtual worlds and supersede the spatio-temporal confines of linear reality.
Virtual reality “creates a phantasmagoria whose precursors are not only radio, television
and video but extends as far back as nineteenth century magic lanterns, panoramas and
dioramas .... When wearing goggles and wrapped in a body glove, the world becomes”
an alternative “in which the distinction between reality and illusion dissolves” because
“our minds and bodies” become “psycho-physical prostheses of the immaterial web in
which we are entangled” (Taylor & Saarinen, 1993, virtual reality, p. 3).
Chapter 4 demonstrates how virtual reality confuses the distinction between the
virtual and the real, the self and virtual selves that the Enlightenment self is fragmented
and seeks reanchoring in virtual worlds. Resultantly, this chapter suggests crafting a
rhetoric of virtual ontotheology bearing in mind the notion that the virtual reality
experience is akin to the mystical experience that constitutes anchorage beyond the linear
realm. Chapter 4 adopts virtual ontotheology as a reconstructionist rhetorical strategy in
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the wake of the deconstruction of the self, by finding anchorage in imaginary, virtual
worlds.
Theoretical reconsiderations for further studies
Rhetoricians have been inadvertently looking for validation from the social
sciences by using methodologies that heavily rely on social scientific principles. On one
hand, social scientific principles have enhanced clarity, however, on the other hand
creativity and aesthetics suffer heavily when the signifier is domesticated, sanitized and
arbitrarily assigned to a signified. In the same vein, epistemology has been heavily
skewed in the direction of the phenomenal thus submerging the noumenal.
Within the context of cyberspace, this study suggests that there are alternative,
epistemological and rhetorical routes beside the well-traversed ones of direct, symbolical
communication. Symbolic logical communication of the empiricists, structuralists and
classical rhetoricians revolved around a formalized system of symbols, axioms and rules
of inference. As demonstrated in chapter 4, the immersion experience in virtual worlds
is postsymbolic because the virtual world is a referent unto itself although it simulates
the real. However, depending on one’s predilection, one could choose either symbolic
or postsymbolic forms of communication. This study suggests that the postsymbolic is
a viable alternative.
Rather than looking at the virtual world as an imitation of the real, postsymbolic
communication plays upon the notion of simulation as a being unto itself. Bearing this
in mind, this study discussed about two alternative strategies —Virtual Ontotheology
and Media Aesthetics. Future studies can employ virtual ontotheology and media
aesthetics as tools, both critically and poetically to navigate the unfathomable oceans of
virtual worlds. Virtual ontotheology and media aesthetics are explanatory constmcts to
approach creative experiences such as virtual reality in which the realm of the imaginary
is probably as important or even more important as the realm of the real. Both the
concepts help mollify the grief over the apparent deconstruction of the human subject; in
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showing that the subject is only dispersed thus affirming the dispersal as a way of
momentarily escaping the rigidity of the linear tradition.
It must be mentioned that virtual ontotheology occurs at the deconstructive point
where the humanistic ontology is exiled from “full presence” into the “joyous
affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming” (Derrida, 1978,
p. 293). Derrida ( 1978) uses the metaphor of “child-bearing” to describe deconstruction
as giving birth to “an unnamable.... formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of
monstrosity" (p. 293). The monstrosity is terrifying only to the humanist who anchors
his or her being within a linear reality. However, the monstrosity can be liberating for
those who seek anchorage beyond the confines of the linear tradition in creatively
embracing new and virtual worlds.
Within the context of this study, one might ask what comes after deconstructing
the human subject? The answer is virtual ontotheology in a rhetorical liaison with media
aesthetics. Virtual ontotheology as a rhetorical act constitutes the process of
relinquishing the notion of ‘Being’ being securely anchored in the world in favor of
‘Becoming’ in virtual worlds. Another theoretical reconsideration that this study raises,
worth pursuing in future studies might be the notion of the interactive rhetor. The
interactive rhetor is an altemative to the classical rhetorical distinctions of speaker and
audience and mass media distinctions of the producer and receiver based on
conventional theories of reception and transmission. The radical interactivity of the
users in the intemet and other hypertextual platforms render passe the Enlightenment
notion of the autonomous author or subject.
There are several, illimitable directions in which studies on cyberspace can take.
Few among them are on how face-to-face communication in physical space is different
from communication in virtual space, the similarities and differences between male and
female experiences in virtual reality, a phenomenological approach to cyberspace as
opposed to a poststructuralist one etc.
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Limitations
This study has its obvious limitations. While the exploration of the altemateness
of an alternate world in cyberspace has been one the principal strengths of this study, the
altemateness of cyberspace turns out to be one of its chief weaknesses in a sense that
this study does not address some of the heteronomous concerns such as political
economy, the socio-cultural environments, the issue of monopoly in the computer
industry, the question of access to computers and the role of gender and a host of other
important ‘real-life’ issues. At the same time, it must be mentioned that focusing on the
intrinsic, democratic potential of cyberspace within its altemative architecture in itself
constitutes an equally compelling emancipatory rhetoric. As the wise King Solomon
remarks:
For everything there is a season and a time for every matter under the heaven:
a time to be bom, and a time to die:
a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what is planted....
a time to weep, and a time to laugh;
a time to mourn, and a time to dance ....
a time to tear, and a time to sew;
a time to keep silence, and a time to speak .... (Ecclesiastes, 3: 1-5, New
Revised Standard Version).
After years of silent wandering due to an imposed exile by the mainstream academia, the
“time to speak’’ has arrived for the altemative rhetoricians.
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